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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The U.S.-ROK alliance is regarded by many as quite a strong alliance with a 
lifespan of more than half a century. However, the strength of this alliance has varied 
over time, and these two countries have sometimes faced significant conflicts of interest. 
Many factors influence the cohesion of this alliance. This thesis will address the basic 
question: what are the key factors shaping the cohesion of the U.S.-ROK alliance? In 
order to answer this question, thesis research will examine how cohesion in the alliance 
has evolved since the end of the Korean War. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
People who study the cohesion of the U.S.-ROK alliance focus on Korean 
economic or nationalistic drivers. They research how Korean economic development or 
nationalism has influenced the cohesion of this alliance. Although this alliance is derived 
from two states’ agreement, existing research emphasizes only Korean variables. Within 
this context, this paper examines the American variables; few people have focused on this 
area. The U.S. does not accept ROK’s attitudes – strengthening or weakening – toward 
this alliance passively, but actively reflects its interests in alliance cohesion. The U.S. 
attitude has more influence on the cohesion of this alliance than the ROK. Therefore, it is 
important to balance the ROK side with a full analysis. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The U.S-ROK alliance has contributed to stability in East Asia. It had deterred 
coercive expansion of the USSR during the Cold War and has blocked aggressions by the 
North Korea since the end of the Cold War. However, the U.S. and the ROK have 
perceived the importance of the alliance differently. While the U.S. has largely regarded 
the alliance as important within the context of global grand strategy, the ROK has 
regarded it as the essential alliance in its bilateral relationship, given the threat of the 
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DPRK.1 Korean researchers are more interested in the alliance, which results in focusing 
on only their side. Most of them agree that the ROK determines alliance cohesion. After 
the end of the Korean War, the ROK relinquished its autonomy to gain security by 
allying with the U.S. However, the ROK’s rapid economic development and emergence 
of nationalism greatly influenced alliance cohesion of this alliance. By assuming that the 
U.S. always accepts changes in alliance cohesion that the ROK induces, these studies 
exclude U.S. variables. 
This research addresses the U.S. variable to balance the ROK side considered in 
previous research. Kent Calder and Min Ye describe the role of crisis as “altering the pre-
existing bargaining context and causing changing and breeding stimulus for change.”2 
They explain that the crisis includes “a swift change of power distribution within a 
system, collapse of authority, or wars and other forms of violence.”3 This research 
assumes that the U.S. has had four significant crises: Détente, the second Cold War, 
global terrorism, and the rise of China. Based on assumption, this research examines 
whether the U.S. perception of these four crises is an essential factor shaping alliance 
cohesion. With regard to the U.S. perception of the USSR, the détente with the USSR in 
the 1980s, the outbreak of the Second Cold War, and the collapse of the USSR are 
significant inflections in alliance cohesion. According to the level of the USSR’s threat to 
the U.S., alliance cohesion may have been either weakened or strengthened. September 
11 attacks converted the U.S. perception of a crisis to Terrorism. As the U.S. 
concentrated on the Middle East for military interventions, the alliance in North East Asia 
became less important. Thus, alliance cohesion in this period may have been quite weak. 
However, alliance cohesion may be again strengthened because of China’s rapid 
economic growth. Based on strong economic power, China has pursued political status 
matching its economic status. The rise of China has resulted in territorial disputes with 
neighboring states. Since the U.S. begins to perceive China’s growing power as a crisis, 
                                                 
1 Victor Cha, “Realism, Liberalism, and the Durability of the U.S.-South Korean Alliance,” Asian 
Survey (1997): 614. 
2 Kent Calder and Min Ye, “Regionalism and Critical Junctures: Explaining the Organization Gap in 
Northeast Asia,” Journal of East Asian Studies 4, no. 2 (2004): 198-9 
3 Ibid. 
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the cohesion of the alliance in this period may become stronger. The hypothesis for this 
research is summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1.   The hypothesis for the thesis 








Second Cold War: Soviet War in Afghan Strong 
1990s ~ 
2000s 
Terrorism Collapse of the Soviet Union, 9.11 attack Weak 
2010s China Political and economic rise of China Strong 
 
In conclusion, hypothesizing that the U.S. perception of a crisis is a key 
determinant of alliance cohesion, this thesis will examine the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. The U.S.-ROK Alliance 
Bueno de Mesquita and David Singer argue that the average lifespan of a defense 
treaty is one hundred fifteen months, a neutrality agreement is ninety-four months, and an 
entente is sixty-eight months.4 Considering that the lifespan of U.S-ROK alliance is more 
than half a century, strong alliance cohesion between the U.S. and the ROK has proven to 
be enduring. However, alliance cohesion has not always been strong since the signing in 
1953. The history of the U.S-ROK alliance shows that alliance cohesion has fluctuated. 
While weak in some periods, it became stronger in other periods. 
Previous research suggests that several key factors shape alliance cohesion. Victor 
D. Cha argues that the level of convergence among alliance partners about the security 
concept determines alliance cohesion. To explain the meaning of security the concept, 
                                                 
4 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and J. David Singer, “Alliances, Capabilities, and War: A Review and 
Synthesis,” Political Science Annual: An International Review 4 (1973): 237-80. 
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Cha suggests a dichotomy of realism and pluralism with contrasting attitudes toward a 
crisis. Since realism describes international relations as constrained and conflictual, it 
prefers hard line deterrence by projecting overwhelming military forces. By contrast, 
pluralism stresses possible cooperation between states. Pluralists contend that negotiation 
and talks are much better ways to resolve conflicts, debunking the realist approach. If all 
allies have the same security concept, the degree of convergence is quite high, which 
results in strong alliance cohesion. On the other hand, if security concepts are defined 
differently, the degree of convergence is quite low, which produces weak alliance 
cohesion.5 
Cha explains the change in U.S.-ROK alliance cohesion by analyzing one 
significant case. The case is the Agreed Framework (AF) in 1994 toward nuclear 
development by the North Korea. With regard to the approach toward NK’s suspected 
nuclear weapons development, the U.S. and ROK defined their respective security 
concepts differently; while the U.S. followed pluralism, the ROK persisted with realism. 
This divergence was caused by the end of the Cold War: “A gradual shift in the U.S. 
toward more pluralist conceptions of security has taken place.”6 The U.S. signed the AF 
with North Korea on October 21, 1994 despite ROK’s implicit opposition. The key 
objective of the AF was to curb the nuclear power plant program not through coercive 
military intervention but negotiation and talk. However, the ROK had to define its 
security concept as realism. Although the Cold war ended peacefully, its residue still 
threatened ROK’s security. The NK did not abandon the dream of unification and 
conducted several provocations against the ROK. In the post-Cold war, the North Korean 
nuclear threat illustrates the divergence between Washington and Seoul. This divergence 
caused the U.S-ROK alliance to be weakened. While the ROK security concept is fixed, 
the U.S. security concept is quite flexible. Therefore, the security definition of the U.S. is 
the key determinant of alliance cohesion.7 
                                                 
5 Cha, Realism, Liberalism, and Durability of Alliance, 609-17. 
6 Ibid., 615. 
7 Ibid., 617-22 
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However, Korean scholars disagree with Cha’s argument. Specifically, Hyo-Keun 
Jee argues that ROK’s alliance security culture is the core variable shaping the alliance 
cohesion.8 Jee defines alliance cohesion as the level of cooperation among allied states in 
the security sector. Within constructivism, he asserts that the alliance security culture 
reevaluates threat recognition and alliance interest, which greatly influence alliance 
cohesion. He suggests four indicators to measure the change in this alliance cohesion: 
“military power and the armament of the United States Force Korea (USFK), pledges of 
the leaders, the degree of alliance institutionalization, and ROK-U.S. combined Drills.”9 
As a result, he discovers that in the early 1980s, this alliance cohesion is the strongest 
because the alliance culture of ROK was “dependent cooperation.”10 In this period, the 
ROK had to depend on the security umbrella of the U.S. because ROK’s military and 
economic power was too weak to deter DRPK’s provocations. The U.S. also needed a 
strong alliance to contain the expansion of the USSR. On the other hand, this alliance was 
the weakest in the first decade of the 2000s. The alliance culture of the ROK was 
changed from dependent cooperation to independent conflict. Based on ROK rapid 
economic growth known as the miracle of the Han River, the ROK possessed strong 
economic power, which increased Korea’s desire for independent defense. This pursuit of 
self-defense resulted in weakened alliance cohesion.  
While Cha asserts that the U.S. attitude is flexible, Jee argues that the U.S. 
attitude toward this alliance is fixed, and the U.S. should accept ROK’s changed alliance 
culture in order to maintain strong alliance cohesion.11 According to Cha, major threats 
of the U.S. have changed, but the major threat to the ROK remains the same: North 
Korea. Consequently, in the case of the U.S-ROK alliance, U.S. variables are the key 
factors shaping the cohesion of the alliance. 
                                                 
8 Hyo-keun Jee, “Alliance Security Culture and Alliance Cohesiveness: A Case Study on ROK-US 
Alliance, 1968-2005” (PhD dissertation, The Graduate School of Yonsei University, 2004): 1-254. 
9 Ibid., 253. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Cha, Realism, Liberalism, and Durability of Alliance, 615: Jee, “Alliance Security Culture and 
Alliance Cohesiveness,” 253. 
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My research will develop and expand Cha’s argument, in order to evaluate its 
contrasts to `’s argument. Cha does not provide methods to measure alliance cohesion, 
and his article only deals with a short period. Thus, my research elaborates upon his 
article and examines the changes in alliance cohesion by providing more detailed 
evidence. In addition, since the previous research emphasizes Korean drivers, this 
research balances it by focusing on the U.S. variables.  
2. Alliance Cohesion 
In previous research, four prominent definitions of alliance cohesion exist. This 
research does not arbitrarily choose one definition or create a new definition by merging 
four definitions, but will use them all. Although four definitions differ slightly from each 
other, they define alliance cohesion similarly. They are all trying to explain more or less 
the same thing. 
Ole R. Holsti defines alliance cohesion as “the ability of alliance partners to agree 
upon goals, strategy, and tactics, and to coordinate activities directed toward those 
ends.”12 Holsti argues that alliance cohesion is the level of allied nations’ agreements. If 
an alliance partner strongly agrees and supports an ally’s opinions, alliance cohesion is 
strong, and vice versa. In addition, Holsti pays attention to the relation between alliance 
cohesion and efficacy. He defines efficacy as “the ability of the alliance to achieve its 
goals.”13 According to him, when alliance is based not on agreement but coercion by the 
stronger allied partner, alliance cohesion is weakened. As a result, the efficacy of the 
alliance is reduced. Although some debunk the idea that alliance cohesion improves 
efficacy, most researchers agree that effective alliances have strong cohesion. Since 
strong alliance cohesion leads allies to reorganize their alliance, allies can eliminate 
inconsistencies that are a major obstacle to unity. 
Freidman, Bladen, and Rosen describe the main characteristic of alliance cohesion 
as togetherness. They contend that togetherness is explained by sharing a common 
                                                 
12 Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in 
International Alliances (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), 16. 
13 Ibid. 
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purpose, because a major purpose of the alliance is to achieve common goals. The more 
fully goals are shared, the greater the alliance cohesion. When a state decides on the level 
of sharing, expected costs and rewards play key roles. If an ally cannot anticipate more 
rewards than costs, one has a low degree of alliance cohesion, which results in weakened 
alliance cohesion. Therefore, what influences unity most strongly in an alliance is the 
agreement between allies about the sharing of costs and rewards.14 
Glenn H. Snyder defines alliance cohesion as two significant perspectives: 
interests and military cooperation. As Snyder emphasizes the role of interests, he argues 
that alliance partners decide on the level of agreement with an ally depending on their 
interests. He adds, “Alliances are more highly valued, and are more likely to form, when 
their members have substantial interests in common.”15 Alliance cohesion depends on the 
extent of shared interests. According to Snyder, an alliance needs validation to prevent 
the alliance from collapsing. One allied state requires its partner to show the reassurance 
of its interests. Allied states demonstrate the reassurance of their shared interests using 
three tools: creating and specifying combined military planning; backing up allied 
partners in case of disputes with non-allied states; announcing official restatements of the 
alliance. Allied states strongly ask for these validations when they doubt partners’ 
alliance commitment.16 
Snyder stresses not only the role of interests, but also military cooperation with 
regard to alliance cohesion. He argues that alliance cohesion depends on the degree of 
military cooperation. According to Snyder, dependence is a key factor influencing 
alliance cohesion. The definition of dependence is quite limited. It does not cover all 
sectors within the relationship but includes only essential values and needs; it excludes 
inessential luxuries. Snyder reduces the definition of alliance dependence to military 
affairs. Considering that alliance dependence greatly influences alliance cohesion, 
military cooperation plays a significant role in determining the level of dependence and is 
                                                 
14 Julian R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen and Steven Rosen, Alliance in International Politics 
(Needham Height, NJ: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), 288-89. 
15 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 11. 
16 Ibid. 
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a key factor in shaping alliance cohesion. Snyder explains elements of military 
dependence as “a state’s need for military assistance, the degree to which the ally fills 
that need, and alternative ways of meeting the need.”17 The key word in military 
dependence is a state’s need, which is closely related to military cooperation. A state’s 
need indicates one’s lack of actual and potential resources compared to the resources of 
the adversary. Consequently, the need for military resources determines the level of 
alliance cohesion of a state, because the state wants to supplement its shortage of military 
resources with contributions from its partners.18 
Researchers, who have written about alliance cohesion, do not analyze the case of 
the U.S.-ROK alliance. Instead, most of them focus on NATO. Based on four prominent 
definitions, this research adds the case of the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This research analyzes alliance cohesion by using a Case Study: the U.S.-ROK 
alliance. Focusing on major crises, this research chronologically evaluates alliance 
cohesion. The thesis research addresses a prospective timeframe from the 1970s to 2013 
chronologically and excludes the early period of the alliance: from 1953 to the 1960s. 
Considering that the alliance was formed in 1953, alliance cohesion in this period was 
strong. Thus, the starting point of the analysis is the time that change in the alliance 
cohesion first took place. According to the U.S. response to four significant crises, this 
research divides the whole period into four sub-periods: the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, the first 
decade of the 2000s, and 2010s. 
The change in alliance cohesion is gauged not by the absolute level but by the 
relative level. Compared to preceding period’s the strength of alliance cohesion, this 
research evaluates its changes as strong or weak. For example, alliance cohesion of the 
1980s becomes stronger than the 1970s. In order to evaluate alliance cohesion, this 
research chooses four indicators: official statements and documents by leaders, combined 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 166 
18 Ibid., 165-71  
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exercises and operations, the institutionalization of the alliance, and combined military 
capability. These four indicators stem from four prominent definitions of alliance 
cohesion: agreement, sharing costs and rewards, interests, and military cooperation.  
The first indicator, official statements and documents by leaders, is derived from 
agreements and interests. High-ranking officials of allied states have regular meetings to 
discuss major alliance issues. Reflecting on interests of their own states, they negotiate 
over extended periods to finally reach an agreement. Thus, official statements and 
documents by leaders reflect these bargains.  
The second indicator is combined exercises and operations that stem from 
military cooperation. Allies conduct diverse regular combined exercises to improve the 
effectiveness of military operations. Combined exercises guarantee allies’ military 
support in wartime.  
The third indicator, the institutionalization of the alliance, is related to both 
military cooperation and sharing costs and rewards. Once the institutionalization of the 
alliance is established, the responsibilities of respective allies for military actions are 
elaborated. Allies agree with the level of military burden sharing through alliance 
institutions.  
The last indicator is combined military capability, which is closely related to 
sharing costs and rewards. Allies improve the effectiveness of military actions to upgrade 
their military armaments in accordance with allied partners’ equipment. To develop 
combined military capability, purchasing similar weapons is advantageous. Making 
sharing information easier and faster improves interoperability. Therefore, decision 
makers take combined military actions into consideration when they select the next 
weapon system. 
To identify the strength of alliance cohesion, this research synthesizes literature 
from several fields: official statements by presidents and high-ranking government 
officials, two states’ agreement in alliance institutions, and relevant scholarly efforts by 
alliance experts. This research uses agreements and reports by the U.S.-ROK Security 
Consultative Meeting (SCM) over which two state defense ministers preside. By 
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providing evidence related to costs, this research argues that the U.S. perception is the 
key determinant of alliance cohesion. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis contains six chapters. Chapter I introduces the study’s major research 
question, its importance, the hypothesis, the literature review, and methods. Specifically, 
the introduction focuses on explaining definitions of alliance cohesion and finding proper 
indicators for measurement of alliance cohesion. Chapter II-VI will address each period’s 
strength of alliance cohesion. To evaluate alliance cohesion, this research analyzes four 
indicators based on four definitions of alliance cohesion: official statements and 
documents by leaders, combined exercises and operations, the institutionalization of the 
alliance, and combined military capability. They respectively explain the reason for 
changes in alliance cohesion by showing the U.S. perception of crises: the détente with 
the USSR, the Second Cold War, the collapse of the USSR and Terrorism, and the rise of 
China. Finally, by summing up the study’s results and the reasons for change in alliance 




II. DÉTENTE WITH THE USSR IN THE 1970S 
A. THE U.S. DOMINANT SECURITY OUTLOOK 
After World War II, the U.S. and the USSR became the most significant actors 
influencing all nations. During the 1950s and 1960s, endless conflicts and arms races 
aggravated the two superpowers’ military and political relationships. However, in the 
1970s, the two countries’ escalated tensions were sharply mitigated. Popularly, it was 
known as détente. The two nations focused on lessening sharp military confrontations 
and avoiding potential nuclear war.  
1. Major Driving Events 
In the 1970s, the U.S. and the USSR agreed to peaceful co-existence, détente; the 
literal definition of détente is a “relaxation of tension.”19 The term was primarily used to 
characterize the U.S. and the USSR’s shared efforts to develop their relationship in the 
1970s.20 Keith L. Nelson defined détente as an “improvement in Soviet-American 
relations.”21 The two nations’ severe military conflicts were greatly lessened, and their 
military and political relationships were improved.  
The Soviet Union’s consistent military buildup led Moscow to possess strong 
military might. In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the Soviet Union succeeded in 
catching up with the U.S.’s military power by modernizing its armed forces and 
developing nuclear technology. After the Cuban crisis in October 1962, Moscow 
recognized that the USSR’s military was inferior to the U.S. The USSR would have to 
improve its military strength, especially strategic nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union 
intended to deploy its ballistic missiles in Cuba, but the U.S. strongly opposed the 
Soviets’ plan and warned a full scale nuclear attacks. Since the Soviet’s military power 
was much weaker than the U.S., to abandon this plan was the wisest for the Soviets’ 
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leader. The USSR deconstructed missile bases and withdrew deployed missiles in Cuba. 
After that, Moscow concentrated on modernizing its military and developing nuclear 
warheads. William G. Hyland explained, “Since the Cuban crisis, Moscow had embarked 
on a sustained buildup of strategic weapons.”22 Finally, the Soviet Union succeeded in 
upgrading its military might: “In 1969, the Soviet Union claimed strategic equality with 
the U.S., and many analysts in Washington though Moscow aimed at achieving a 
strategic superiority.”23 By advancing its military power, the Soviet Union aimed to be 
ratified by the U.S. as a nuclear and military power and to be legitimately recognized as a 
leading role in Eastern Europe.24  
To respond to increased Soviet threats, President Richard Nixon and Henry 
Kissinger designed the blueprints for détente. President Nixon determined that he would 
handle the deteriorated relationship with the Soviet Union by talks not by force. He 
believed that cooperation with the USSR would be a more effective approach than hard-
liner deterrence. President Nixon declared a reconciling policy in his inaugural speech, 
saying “after a period of confrontation, [the U.S.] is entering an era of conciliation.”25 
This speech indicated that U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union significantly 
shifted from confrontation to negotiation. The U.S.’s aim was to create peaceful relations 
by reducing the risk of nuclear war with the Soviets. Nixon and Kissinger called this 
mechanism “a structure of peace.”26  
To provide a huge incentive for the Soviets to discuss reconciliation, Washington 
officially admitted the USSR as another military superpower and accepted the military 
parity between the U.S. and the USSR.27 The U.S. also made negotiations separated from 
competition in the Third World to provide incentives for the USSR. This was a first step 
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for peaceful co-existence.28 Moscow positively responded to a Nixon’s announcement. 
Moscow announced that the USSR would become “a peaceful and businesslike 
[nation].”29 The overarching goal of the U.S. and the USSR in détente was to restrict 
arms races. Hyland stressed the importance of controlling arms races.30 Since the two 
nations already possessed enough ballistic missiles to annihilate others, further arms races 
were useless. Thus, they agreed to arms control to reduce competition.31 
In May 1971, with greatly overlapped objectives, President Nixon officially stated 
that “the U.S. and the Soviet Union had agreed to concentrate that year on negotiating an 
ABM agreement.”32 He announced that the two countries would soon reach an agreement 
on the restriction of offensive arms.33 The U.S. and the USSR finally reached détente. 
Radhe Gopal Pradhan argued, “Détente is an inevitable process in superpower 
relations.”34 He explained that even though one superpower spent billions of dollars to 
grab the superior position, the opponent should catch up with one to make a balance 
again.35 The two superpowers had the incentive for a halt of their arms races.  
To avoid misunderstanding about opponents’ military behaviors, the two nations 
established direct communication channels such as the Hotline Agreement in 1963. Both 
sides signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, and participated in the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. Since these agreements enabled the two nations to 
predict others’ actions and reduced the risks of nuclear wars, they contributed to 
establishing a constructive relationship between the U.S. and the USSR.  
Under the favorable atmosphere in the early 1970s the U.S. and the USSR signed 
two significant agreements: the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Anti-
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Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The SALT prohibited Washington and Moscow from 
developing launchers of offensive missile systems. This led to an agreement with an 
ABM treaty in May 1972, which prohibited them from upgrading anti-missile defense 
systems. Two agreements contributed to mitigating nuclear arms races by restricting 
offensive and defensive arms’ developments. McNamara assessed these agreements as 
paramount achievements during détente.36 The U.S. and the Soviet Union moved from 
the unstable nuclear war age to the mutual-cooperation age for peaceful co-existence. To 
further their bilateral military relationship, they additionally signed several agreements: 
the Naval agreement in 1972, the basic principles agreement in 1972, the agreement on 
avoidance of nuclear war in 1973, and the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. In sum, the U.S. 
and the USSR moved from sharp confrontation called the Cold War toward a new 
harmonious atmosphere called détente, which greatly influenced U.S. security policy and 
dominant U.S. threat perception. 
2. U.S. Perception and Response 
When Nixon was inaugurated as President in 1969, the U.S. faced with several 
unsolvable international matters. After the Soviet Union achieved military parity with the 
U.S., it expanded its influences more aggressively with upgraded military power 
including nuclear weapons. Moscow’s advanced nuclear missiles made the Americans 
worried about a nuclear war and ensuing co-collapse. In addition, the U.S. suffered from 
economic difficulty to win arms races. To upgrade its weapon system required billions of 
dollars in order to match the Soviet Union’s military strength. To make matters worse, 
the failure in the Vietnam War and continuing military operations in Vietnam seriously 
weakened the U.S.’s military and economic strength. In the late 1960s, the American 
public required the White House to end the war. To deal with the above major problems, 
reconciliation with the USSR was essential for the U.S.  
The Soviet Union achieved military parity, including nuclear technology, led the 
American public to feel concerned about the collapse caused by the nuclear war. The 
U.S.’s domestic atmosphere no longer favored arms competition. The American public 
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and Congress forced newly inaugurated President Richard M. Nixon to negotiate with the 
Soviet Union to limit arms races including strategic nuclear arsenals.37 The Soviet 
Union’s domestic situation was similar to the U.S. The Soviets began to worry about a 
nuclear war and co-collapse. Peter Wallensteen explained “the common interest was 
nuclear war avoidance, and most other aspects appeared subordinated to this or became 
means to achieve [detente].”38 The U.S.’s ultimate goal was compatible with that of the 
USSR.  
The U.S. suffered from economic difficulty to win arms races. The U.S. and the 
Soviet Union were short of raw materials to continue their military competitions. Keith L. 
Nelson discussed how “a scarcity or potential scarcity in both countries of resources was 
needed to maintain the current structure.”39 The White House had economic and 
technical reasons to take into consideration reconciliation with the Moscow. It concluded 
that protections against the Soviets’ ballistic missiles were too expensive and even 
doubted the effectiveness of anti-missile defense systems. Considering that the U.S.’s 
new military modernization programs required billions of dollars on an ongoing basis, it 
could not afford the costs of military upgrading.  
Above all, the U.S. had a significant objective in détente. The U.S. intended to 
end the Vietnam War quickly. President Nixon described the Vietnam War as “a subject 
of deep concern to all American and to many people in all parts of the world.”40 As 
Bruce W. Jentleson discussed, “The Vietnam War was the most profound setback 
American foreign policy had suffered since the beginning of the Cold War.” As 
mentioned earlier, due to the failure in the Vietnam War, the U.S.’s political and military 
leadership was seriously damaged.41 Many nations began to doubt the credibility of the 
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U.S. military power. The expense of Vietnam War caused the U.S. economy to be 
trapped in recession. The CRS Report for Congress estimated the military cost of the 
Vietnam War: from 1965 to 1975, the U.S. spent $111 billion, which had the same value 
to $686 billion in 2008.42 Moreover, the American public did not support continuing the 
Vietnam War, because the number of casualties exceeded two hundred thousand. The 
anti-Vietnam War movement was strong in the U.S., and Americans urged the 
government to change U.S. foreign policy toward Vietnam and end the Vietnam War 
quickly. For the U.S. military’s withdrawal from Vietnam, the U.S. needed to obtain the 
USSR’s support or at least passive acceptance.43 Raymond Garthoff argued that “the 
dominant foreign policy preoccupation of Nixon and Kissinger … was finding an 
honorable exit from Vietnam.”44 Kissinger believed that to settle the Vietnam War 
rapidly, the improvement of the U.S. political and military relationship with the USSR 
was an essential precondition.45 To obtain the Soviets’ favorable responses, the Nixon 
administration more actively pursued the achievement of détente. Thus, it was inevitable 
for the U.S. to reconcile with the USSR. Washington welcomed reconciliation with 
Moscow. Since Soviet threats greatly reduced, the U.S. concentrated on dealing with 
above three major problems: the fear of co-collapse, economic burden, and the Vietnam 
War.   
The changed U.S. threat perception of the Soviet Union influenced the military 
relationship between the U.S. and the ROK. South Korea was an ideal military base for 
the U.S. during the early Cold War era. Scholars acknowledged the geographical value of 
the Korean Peninsula. Richard T. Detrio posited that the Peninsula “[is] a distinct asset to 
the U.S. in terms of an ability to monitor Soviet activities in the East Asia and the Pacific 
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Ocean.”46 The U.S. armed forces in South Korea could easily access the East China Sea 
and the Yellow Sea to check the Soviets’ expansion. However, détente led the U.S. to 
perceive the Soviet Union as a weaker threat. Under diminished Soviet threats, the 
benefits that South Korea provided were not essential for the U.S. Washington still 
needed to maintain the U.S.-ROK alliance, but reinforcing the alliance became less 
important.   
B. THE COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE 
After the achievement of détente, Washington perceived Moscow as a weak 
threat. The changes in dominant U.S. threat perception caused the geographical value of 
the Korean Peninsula to decrease. However, the U.S. did not outright eliminate the 
alliance, because the Soviet Union did not fully collapse. The four indicators 
demonstrated that the shift in dominant U.S. threat perception influenced the cohesion of 
the U.S.-ROK alliance.  
1. Official Statements and Documents by Leaders 
In his Guam speech of July 1969, President Nixon declared “the policy of 
Vietnamization.” This policy required South Vietnam to increase its responsibility for 
military operations in the Vietnam War and the U.S. DOD to reduce the involvement of 
the U.S.47 The speech developed into “the Nixon doctrine,” which brought significant 
changes in the relationships between the U.S. and its Asian allied countries. The Nixon 
doctrine’s ultimate aim was to decrease the U.S. military and economic burden by 
handing over the U.S. responsibility for East Asian allies’ security to them. The U.S. 
would continue to support its allies to protect their security, but the countries themselves 
should be primarily responsible for their national defense.48 Following this doctrine, the 
government started to reduce its responsibility for Asian allies’ security. The doctrine 
also stressed, “We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a 
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nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.”49 By 
redefining the U.S. armed forces’ role as supporting, President Nixon intended to avoid 
the U.S.’s automatic military interventions in Asian allies’ conflicts. He would evade 
another Vietnam War that would seriously undermine the U.S.’s economic and military 
power. He also aimed to balance the U.S. budget deficit by reducing the U.S. 
involvement.50  
Following the Nixon doctrine, Washington withdrew 20,000 U.S. troops from 
South Korea in 1971. Since the U.S. commitment was reduced, South Korea’s security 
became at risk. North Korea, South Korea’s major enemy, did not cease its provocations. 
It planted detonation of explosive on roof of entrance to National Cemetery in 1970 and 
attempted to President Park Chung-hee in Seoul’s National Theater in 1974; instead of 
Park, first lady Yuk Yeong-su killed.51 In the 1970s, South Korea found three North 
Korea’s infiltration tunnels under DMZ in Gyeonggi-do. ROK President Park Jung-hee 
had opposed U.S. troops’ reduction. Since U.S reductions in advance of the ROK 
modernization caused a military imbalance in the Korean Peninsula, North Korea could 
execute serious provocations.52 President Park officially announced, “The U.S. reduction 
should be small, and any military realignment should be accompanied by a sharp rise in 
U.S. military assistance to the ROK.”53 Despite Seoul’s strong demands, President Nixon 
and Kissinger did not change their original plan, and the U.S. military withdrew as 
planned. 
 U.S. President Jimmy Carter greatly weakened the cohesion of the U.S.-ROK 
alliance by stressing the importance of human rights in South Korea. Since the Soviet 
Union’s security threat was diminished, President Carter could pay attention to non-
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security agenda. President Park worried that Carter’s inauguration in early 1977 would be 
a big obstacle in the relationship between the U.S. and ROK. Since he was a presidential 
candidate, President Carter had continually urged South Korea to improve its human 
rights. However, denying Carter’s demands on human rights, President Park consolidated 
his authoritarian regime. Park suspended the establishment of the Constitution and 
strengthened the martial law. By establishing “a new revitalized (yushin) constitution,” he 
succeeded in obtaining centralized political power, prolonging his presidential term, and 
restricting civil movements.54 Regarding Seoul’s uncooperative responses, President 
Carter planned a phased withdrawal of the USFK and the pullout of nuclear weapons 
from South Korea. With reduced Soviet threat, he did not need to exclusively emphasize 
security issues. The Carter administration announced that the USFK’s withdrawal would 
be completed within four to five years. According to this plan, 6,000 troops would 
withdraw during Phase I (1978−1979), 9,000 soldiers during Phase II (− June 1980), and 
two Brigades and Division headquarters during Phase III. Although the plan was 
cancelled in 1979, 3,400 troops had been withdrawn in 1978.55  
To respond to the U.S. withdrawal, ROK President Park declared the policy of 
cha’ju (self-reliance).56 The ROK initiated the first phase of the Force Improvement Plan 
(Yulgok Project) to modernize its military on February 25, 1974.57 Its major aim was to 
improve military equipment and develop defense industries. However, Seoul was short of 
military technology and military budget to achieve cha’ju. The consistent pursuit of the 
policy would aggravate its military relationship with the U.S., which would be a grave 
peril in South Korea’s security; “if [the ROK] had [its] way, the U.S. would bring in an 
additional two divisions.”58 Seoul decided to abolish its plan and solicit the U.S.’s 
military support to protect itself from Pyeongyang. 
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Reflecting on the unfavorable relationship between Washington and Seoul, the 
number of summit meetings was decreased. In the 1960s, the U.S. and ROK presidents 
held seven summit meetings in Washington and Seoul; ROK President Park Chung-hee 
officially visited the U.S. to meet President Johnson and Nixon in 1965, 1968, and 1969. 
However, in the 1970s, only two summit meetings were held only in Seoul. The U.S. 
president did not invite the ROK president to Washington. The reduction of summit 
meetings’ number and Seoul’s unilateral invitation to U.S. presidents indicated that the 
U.S. was less interested in South Korea.59  
In sum, South Korea intended to maintain strong alliance cohesion due to North 
Korean war provocations. On the other hand, the U.S.’s changed grand strategy, such as 
the Nixon doctrine, did not require the strong alliance because of détente with the Soviet 
Union. However, since Soviet threats had not fully disappeared, the U.S. needed to 
maintain the alliance to prepare for contingencies. Therefore, alliance cohesion became 
weak, specifically with respect to official statements and documents by leaders. 
2. Combined Exercises and Operations 
With respect to the second indicator, combined exercises and operations, alliance 
cohesion became strong. Many combined exercises were newly initiated, and operation 
plans were sophisticated. These exercises contributed to improving the U.S. and ROK’s 
defense interoperability. Since the Soviet Union did not collapse, the U.S. did not 
eliminate the U.S.-ROK alliance, but maintained it. To supplement the withdrawal of the 
USFK, the U.S. had to establish diverse combined exercises. These exercises contributed 
to improving warfare fighting capabilities and showing combined armed forces’ strength. 
The Ulchi Focus Lens Exercise (UFL) was a command post exercise (CPX), 
which trained combined forces’ commanders and their subordinate staff. Since being 
established in 1976, the UFL was performed annually. Its main purposes were not only 
“to improve not only the conduct of war and specific warfare capabilities,” but also “to 
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ensure a mastery of the procedures for specific warfare fighting capabilities.”60 The UFL 
transformed into the most comprehensive combined exercise by integrating two 
exercises; the Focus Lens Exercise supervised by the United Nations Command, and the 
Ulchi Exercise that the ROK military controlled. Not only combined armed forces, but 
also the ROK government participated in the exercise.61 
The Team Spirit exercise was an annual major field training exercise that was 
initiated in 1976. Its key purpose was to protect South Korea from North Korea’s 
provocations. Unlike the UFL, only combined armed forces participated in the Team 
Spirit exercise. Augmented U.S. armed forces from other Pacific bases and its mainland 
also participated in the exercise. Team Spirit contributed to solidifying the U.S.-ROK 
alliance and to developing combined operations to defend the South from the North.  
The Foal Eagle (F/E) exercise was an annual combined field maneuver. Its major 
purpose was to deter North Korea’s war provocations by showing combined armed 
forces’ power.62 It was intended to improve combined and joint operational postures. The 
key military agencies, such as Combined Forces Command (CFC), the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Republic of Korea (JCS), the Special Warfare Command (SWC), and Operations 
Commands, joined in the F/E. In early days, one ROK army Battalion and one U.S. 
Company participated in the exercise. In 1974 and 1975, South Korea found North 
Korea’s two infiltration tunnels, which demonstrated Pyeongyang’s intentions for attack 
again. To respond to escalated tensions, the two nations agreed to broaden the scale of the 
exercise in 1976. The F/E transformed into a grand scale field maneuver exercise 
including combined Special Forces.63  
The Focus-Letina and the Freedom Vault were initiated in 1971. Following the 
Nixon doctrine, the role of the USFK was gradually changed from leading to supporting, 
and many U.S. troops withdrew from South Korea. However, to maintain the U.S.-ROK 
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alliance and prepare for unexpected contingencies such as North Korea’s invasion, the 
U.S. needed to make plans to rapidly project its augmented armed forces to South Korea. 
Reflecting this necessity, the U.S. started the above airlift mobility exercises. These 
exercises’ aims were to gain proficiency in transporting the U.S. armed forces from the 
mainland to the Korean peninsula.64 These exercises demonstrated the U.S.’s readjusted 
military strategy; the allies should be responsible for their security, and the U.S. 
supported them.  
3. The Institutionalization of the Alliance 
The third indicator, the institutionalization of the alliance, was enhanced, and 
resulted in strong alliance cohesion. The U.S. and the ROK established the “U.S.-ROK 
Defense Officials’ Talk between the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the ROK Defense 
Minister;” the meeting was renamed the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in 1971. 
Since the two countries dealt with security issues related to South Korea in the SCM, the 
meeting facilitated their cooperation in security agendas. Moreover, the U.S. and the 
ROK agreed to activate the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) to supplement 
weakened combat powers caused by the USFK’s reduction. Since the commander of the 
CFC controlled and supervised both armed forces, the two nations’ armed forces would 
act in the same direction, which would ensure the high efficiency of combined military 
operations. Although the USFK possessed fewer military troops and equipment than in 
the past, a united commanding structure could maximize combat powers.  
The U.S. and ROK created an official communication channel, which contributed 
to improving the two nations’ security relationship. In January 1968, North Korea 
executed two provocations, the Blue House Raid and the capture of the USS Pueblo, 
which heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula. To respond to these provocations, 
U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson and ROK President Park Chung-hee agreed to hold an 
annual defense cabinet meeting in 1968, which “marked a significant turning point for the 
security of the ROK.”65 The meeting was intended to consult security issues, including 
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North Korea. The first meeting was held in Washington in May 1968, and both sides took 
turns hosting a meeting each year.  
At the 4th meeting in 1971, the title of the meeting was changed from the U.S.-
ROK Defense Officials’ Talk to the “U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting 
(SCM).”66 The change of the title meant that this meeting had evolved into a 
comprehensive security meeting. The SCM became a highest-level security consultative 
body, where the two countries’ security officials discussed security issues and exchanged 
their opinions. The development of the meeting reflected the two nations’ shared needs 
for a more advanced official communication channel. The SCM performed the core 
functions of a substantive policy consultative body. The SCM consisted of two sessions. 
One was the plenary meeting that co-presided over the U.S. Secretary and the ROK 
Minister. The other was five working-level committees that included the Policy Review 
Sub-committee (PRS), the Security Cooperation Committee (SCC), the Logistics 
Cooperation Committee (LCC), the Defense Technology & Industrial Cooperation 
Committee (DTICC), and the Joint Communique Committee (JCC). To consult detailed 
directions at the working level, the committees held a series of meetings before the 
plenary meeting.67 The meeting’s establishment and evolution solidified the security 
cooperation between Washington and Seoul.  
The activation of the CFC contributed to improving the combined defense 
posture. President Jimmy Carter announced a phased plan for the withdrawal of the 
USFK in 1977. In order to supplement the withdrawal, the two nations’ DODs signed an 
agreement to create the CFC at the 10
th
 SCM in 1977. The creation of the CFC was an 
effective way to “deal with the U.S unit reduction and promote U.S.-ROK military 
interoperability.”68 Following this agreement, the CFC was established on November 7, 
1978. The CFC played a key role in deterring recurrence of hostilities on the Korean 
peninsula and guaranteeing effective combined operations. In compliance with the 
Strategic Directive No. 1 that stipulated the assigned missions of the CFC, the 
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commander of the CFC, a four-star U.S. general, could command and supervise both 
armed forces that contained more than 600,000 active duties.69 The CFC also had 
operational control over augmented military forces; “some 3.5 million ROK reservists as 
well as additional U.S. forces deployed from outside the ROK in wartime.”70 The CFC 
became a symbol of strong integration of both sides, because a transnational commanding 
structure was achieved.  
In summary, the establishment of the SCM and the CFC reflected the mutual 
commitment of the U.S. and ROK to maintain peace and security on the Korean 
peninsula. The two institutions contributed to stabilizing the two Koreas’ conflicts by 
deterring North Korea. These institutions supplemented the USFK’s reduction. Therefore, 
the third indicator showed strong alliance cohesion. 
4. Combined Military Capability 
With regard to the fourth indicator, alliance cohesion became weak. Since South 
Korea’s economy was not developed in the 1970s, the ROK definitely had to depend on 
U.S. military support. Moreover, considering that South Korea’s armed forces were ill-
trained and poorly equipped, Washington’s military aid was essential for Seoul’s 
security. Responding to the ROK’s economic difficulty, the U.S. planned to offer a great 
deal of support in the type of grant: the Military Assistance Program (MAP), the Military 
Assistance Service Fund (MASF), and the International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) program.71 The USFK agreed to receive small piece of lands and a few facilities 
for its station from the ROK government. However, the total amount of the U.S. DOD’s 
financial support to the ROK military was much lower than the original plan. With 
reduced U.S. military support, the ROK faced severe problems in pushing ahead its 
military modernization projects. 
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The U.S. government announced diverse economic assistance programs for the 
ROK; “$93 million in PL 480 Title I loans, $20 million in Development Loans, $10 
million in Supporting Assistance, and $5 million in Technical Assistance.”72 The U.S. 
DOD also planned the MAP for the ROK for a five-year period. Its total cost reached 
about $210 million: $20 million in 1972, $40 million in 1973, and $50 million from 1974 
to 1976.73 In order to balance North Korea’s military power and prepare for the Soviets’ 
aggression, upgrading South Korean defense capabilities was significant for the U.S. 
With the U.S.’s financial support, the ROK launched a five-year modernization plan. The 
plan’s major purpose was to improve ground forces and air defense capabilities; Seoul 
modernized Artillery and imported HAWK surface-to-air missiles from the U.S. The 
South Korean government estimated the plan’s budget as $5 billion and would receive 
$1.5 billion from the U.S. through military assistance programs.  
However, Washington did not provide all planned financial support; “The U.S. 
has fulfilled only 69% ($1,034 million) of its aid commitment in the 1971–75 periods.”74 
Since the U.S. economy suffered from a great deal of the Vietnam War expense and 
serious inflation, the U.S. could not afford to provide large scale military aid toward 
South Korea. In reality, the U.S. constantly decreased the total of the MAP: “From about 
$297 million in FY 1973, to $60 million in FY 1976, to $7 million in FY 1977, and to 
nothing in FY 1978.”75 After 1978, South Korea had to finance the necessary budget for 
its military modernization by itself.  
In short, the U.S. provided a large amount of military aid to South Korea, which 
became a basis of the ROK military’s modernization. However, the U.S. military aid was 
not fully executed as previous arranged. Washington worried that the modernization of 
the ROK military would stimulate North Korea to develop its military, which would 
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cause instability in Korea. Reduced military supports caused weak alliance cohesion with 
respect to combined military capabilities. 
C. CONCLUSION 
In the early 1970s, the U.S. and the USSR shared perspectives on peaceful co-
existence, which resulted in détente. The Soviets’ military buildup, economic difficulties 
of the U.S. and the USSR, and public opinion forced Moscow and Washington to 
reconcile with each other. Since the 1950s, the Soviet Union had focused on developing 
its nuclear capabilities. As a result, in the late 1960s, the Soviets caught up with the 
U.S.’s nuclear technology. Since the two countries possessed formidable nuclear missiles, 
they worried that nuclear attacks would result in co-collapse. Since the two nations 
suffered economic recessions, they could not spend billions of dollars on arms races. To 
make matters worse the U.S. was until 1975 trapped in the Vietnam War, which was a 
serious economic, political, and military burden for the U.S. government. Thus, the U.S. 
welcomed reconciliation with the USSR. Signing several significant agreements 
including the SALT and the ABM Treaty, the two superpowers achieved détente. 
Under the favorable atmosphere with the USSR, President Nixon declared the 
Nixon doctrine, which focused on non-intervention in Asia’s disputes. Since the USSR’s 
threat was greatly decreased, the U.S. no longer needed strong allies. Specifically, its 
security relationship with South Korea was deteriorated. The U.S.’s aim was to avoid an 
excessive responsibility for the ROK’s security, which concluded in weak alliance 
cohesion.  
The four indicators, taken overall, demonstrated that the cohesion of the U.S.-
ROK alliance became relatively weaker than during the early period of the alliance. 
Considering that the alliance was formed in 1953, alliance cohesion in this period was the 
strongest. Although two indicators were stronger, the overall evaluation was weaker. 
With respect to the first indicator, official statements and documents by leaders, ROK 
President Park Chung-hee continually emphasized the strong alliance. However, 
Presidents Nixon and Carter showed low interests in strengthening the alliance. As 
President Nixon declared the Nixon doctrine, he stressed that allies should be primarily 
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responsible for their defense. Following the doctrine, President Nixon and his advisor 
Kissinger designed the withdrawal plan of the USFK 7th division from South Korea. 
President Carter also executed the reduction of the USFK by condemning the ROK’s 
inadequate human rights policy. The Nixon doctrine and Carter’s human rights policy 
weakened alliance cohesion. 
The second and third indicators, combined exercises and operations and the 
institutionalization of alliance, were strengthened. As a result, these aspects of alliance 
cohesion became strong. Establishments of the UFL exercise and the Team Spirit 
exercise improved interoperability between the U.S. and ROK militaries. As more units 
participated in the F/E, the exercise’s ranges and components were expanded. The two 
nations made great strides in institutionalization of the alliance. They activated the CFC 
for a firm combined defense posture and established a regular security meeting (SCM) 
between the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the ROK Minister to deal with issues related 
to the Korean Peninsula.  
The last indicator, combined military capability, also showed the U.S.’s lukewarm 
commitment to the alliance. The U.S. planned large scale military aid programs. 
However, the U.S did not fully execute them, because it worried about the Korean 
Peninsula’s instability and its economic recession. The amount of military support was 
annually reduced from 1970. Since South Korea could not afford to upgrade combined 
military capabilities, the capabilities were not improved.  
Although the development of combined exercises and establishments of alliance 
institutions demonstrated strong alliance cohesion, overall alliance cohesion in the 1970s 
became relatively weaker than during the early period of the alliance. The aim of the U.S. 
to strengthen two indicators was to supplement to the USFK’s withdrawal, not to 
reinforce the alliance.76 Since the Soviets’ threats to the U.S. had not fully disappeared 
but decreased, the U.S. needed to at the least maintain the alliance. Therefore, the main 
driver, which led to relatively weak alliance cohesion, was change in dominant U.S. 
threat perception, detente. 
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III. THE SECOND COLD WAR IN THE 1980S 
A. THE U.S. DOMINANT SECURITY OUTLOOK 
During détente, the U.S. and the Soviet Union preferred negotiations and talks to 
hard line deterrence. However, as the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the U.S.-
Soviet relationship was seriously aggravated.77 President Carter strongly denounced the 
Soviets’ invasion and changed the U.S. foreign policy to containment. The Reagan 
Administration took a strict and tough stance to the USSR, which meant the end of 
détente. In the era of détente, the two countries’ confrontation was not ended but 
suspended.  
1. Major Driving Events 
Although détente between Washington and Moscow was regarded as one of the 
greatest achievements in the political sector, it was fragile. John Lewis Gaddis mentioned 
that détente was established not to end U.S.-Soviet competitions but to stabilize them. 
Wallensteen agreed with Gaddis, mentioning that “Détente was the relaxation of tension, 
not the elimination of conflict, hence the choice of the term détente.”78 Since the two 
nations still had many unresolved conflicts, the stability and peace between them could 
be maintained temporarily. Finally, détente ended due to the Soviet Union’s invasion of 
Afghanistan in December 1979; this event was cited as marking the end of détente 
between the two superpowers.79  
The Soviet Union agreed to détente with the U.S. to take advantage of its benefits 
not to end conflicts with the U.S. Moscow continued geopolitical competitions and 
supported communist regimes in the world. Even though the USSR forced North 
Vietnam, its ally in the Vietnam War, to agree the Paris peace treaty in 1973, it covertly 
backed up the North’s military. As a result, in 1975, North Vietnam took over South 
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Vietnam. After winning the Vietnam War, the Soviets more actively aided communist 
movements in Africa. Specifically, Moscow provided a lot of military equipment for 
Marxist coups and guerrilla wars in Angola and Ethiopia.80 The USSR led to the 
imposition of martial law in Poland by the pro-Soviet regime, supported terrorism, and 
posed military threats against western countries.81 
In the end, the USSR’s effort to expand its influence culminated in the invasion of 
Afghanistan in December 1979; “the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan indicated Soviet 
adventurism and expansionism, exploiting opportunities to its own advantage.”82 On 27 
December 1979, the USSR’s armed forces entered Afghanistan and occupied Afghan 
capital, Kabul. The Soviet military seized key political and military commanding 
institutions such as the headquarters of the Ministries of Defense, and central committee. 
By purging opponents including Hafizullah Amin, sometimes called the Josip Tito of 
Afghanistan, the Soviets succeeded in establishing the pro-Soviet regime in 
Afghanistan.83 McNamara argued, “The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was motivated 
by the Soviets’ own evaluation of their security requirements.”84 The Soviet Union 
decided to invade Afghanistan to block the establishment of an anti-Soviet regime and 
the spread of anti-communism. 
After the invasion, Moscow stressed the importance of military interventions 
rather than negotiations. Following redefined military strategy, the Soviet Union 
relocated the majority of its troops, weapons, and military equipment to project its 
military rapidly. Above all, SS-20s missiles were redeployed in Europe; they were 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. This redeployment further 
aggravated the relationship between western countries and the Soviet Union.85 
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Consequently, the Soviets’ invasion of Afghanistan caused the demise of détente, and the 
two superpowers were faced with serious mutual confrontations again.  
2. U.S. Perception and Response 
U.S. foreign policy toward the USSR was greatly changed by the Soviets’ military 
actions. Specifically, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 led the U.S. 
to confirm the demise of détente. Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan 
emphasized deterrence by announcing their own doctrines. President Carter imposed 
many political and economic sanctions against the USSR, and most of them were 
continued by President Reagan.86 The sharp confrontation against the USSR was a 
keynote of the Reagan Administration’s foreign policy.  
As the Soviets executed military interventions in Ethiopia, South Yemen and 
Afghanistan, President Carter strongly denounced Moscow. By regarding these behaviors 
as serious threats to the U.S.’s stability, he warned the USSR that “unless [the Soviet 
Union] withdrew, this inevitably jeopardized the course of United States-Soviet relations 
throughout the world.”87 Carter announced U.S. foreign policy’s shift to the hard line.88 
The Carter administration asked Congress to delay ratification of the SALT II Treaty and 
prohibited sales of grain and military technology to the Soviet Union. It also increased 
cooperation with the Soviets’ enemies. Washington strengthened its relationship with 
Beijing and provided Pakistan with military aids. 
The primary concern of the U.S. government was that the Soviets intended to seek 
hegemony in the oil-rich Persian Gulf region beyond Afghanistan.89 In January 1980, 
President Carter declared “the Carter Doctrine” to contain the Soviet Union. He 
announced, “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region 
will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the U.S.”90 The main purpose of the 
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doctrine was to block the Soviets’ expansion to the Gulf region. The détente-positive 
Carter administration chose hard-liner deterrence to secure its interests.  
When Ronald Reagan was inaugurated as President in January 1981, U.S. foreign 
policy toward the USSR became more harsh and offensive. Since Reagan was a candidate 
for presidential election, he consistently criticized and opposed détente stating; “we are 
blind to reality if we refuse to recognize that détente’s usefulness to the Soviets is only as 
a cover for their traditional and basic strategy for aggression.”91 President Reagan 
stressed decisive military responses against large Soviet military threats to Washington 
and its allies. The foreign policy framework of the Reagan administration was to oppose 
“acquiescence in the Cold War status quo.”92 Reagan preferred confrontational 
approaches rather than cooperative measures in détente, which developed into “the 
Reagan Doctrine,” which “advocated opposition to Communist-supported regimes 
wherever they existed, as well as a willingness to directly challenge the Soviet Union on 
a variety of fronts.”93 With the Reagan Doctrine, Washington planned a wide array of 
military buildup to balance with the USSR. It believed that the Soviet Union’s military 
power was superior to the U.S.94 To redress the military imbalance, the White House 
focused on modernizing its armed forces and advancing military technologies. Above all, 
President Reagan concentrated on upgrading nuclear capabilities to reverse strategic 
imbalances. Since Congress agreed to increase defense budget, Reagan had no difficulty 
with conducting military modernization.  
In March 1983, the Reagan administration’s hard-liner stance against the USSR 
was culminated by two speeches. On March 8, President Reagan delivered “the Evil 
Empire speech” at the National Association of Evangelicals in Florida. He resolutely 
condemned the USSR’s military actions that threatened worldwide peace and stability 
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and labeled the Soviet Union as “the focus of evil in the modern world.”95 After two 
weeks, he made “the Star Wars speech.” President Reagan stated that his administration 
would initiate the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) plan and established the Strategic 
Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO). The SDI plan’s aim was to protect the U.S. from 
a massive launch of Soviets’ strategic nuclear ballistic missiles. The basic concept of the 
SDI was to “make nuclear weapons obsolete” through the interception of ballistic-missile 
warheads in space or ground.96 The Soviet Union blamed the U.S. for aggravating arms 
competition, insisting that Moscow was only interested in homeland security.97 Despite 
the Soviets’ criticism, Reagan consistently spent billions of dollars on the SDI plan. To 
isolate Moscow politically, Washington encouraged non-communist states to participate 
in a strategic coalition against the Soviet Union, emphasizing that the Soviets were 
serious threats to them. The Reagan administration strengthened cooperation with China, 
which was an important partner of the USSR, to check the USSR more efficiently.98  
The U.S.-Soviet relationship fell to the lowest point, and it was impossible for the 
two nations to re-construct a cooperative relationship.99 Reacting to escalated tensions 
with the Soviet Union, the U.S. reevaluated the geographical value of South Korea. The 
presence of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) played a key role in deterring the Soviet 
Union. Considering geographic proximity between South Korea and the Soviet Union, 
the USFK could address conflicts with the Soviet Union more effectively and quickly. In 
addition, the strong alliance with South Korea would provide the U.S. with a lodgment 
for projection of other military in a war against the Soviet Union.100 Since the U.S. 
identified the Soviets as strong threats, it needed the benefits that Seoul offered. 
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B. THE COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE 
After the Soviets’ invasion of Afghanistan, Washington perceived Moscow as a 
strong threat. The changes in dominant U.S. threat perception led Washington to 
reevaluate the geographical value of the Korean Peninsula. The four indicators 
demonstrated that the shift in dominant U.S. threat perception influenced the cohesion of 
the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
1. Official Statements and Documents by Leaders 
In the 1980s, U.S. President Ronald W. Reagan and ROK President Chun Doo-
hwan demonstrated their commitment to the U.S.-ROK alliance, which resulted in strong 
alliance cohesion. In the 1970s, the Carter administration had not been interested in 
improving the relationship with the ROK. Since President Carter focused on human 
rights policy, he did not recognize the ROK’s authoritarian regime as a legitimate 
government. However, President Reagan emphasized the U.S.-ROK security relationship. 
Richard T. Detrio mentioned that Reagan’s basic strategic objective in Asia was to 
contain the Soviet Union’s expansion.101 Detrio argued that since South Korea played a 
key role in the U.S. plan, “[Reagan] made no secret of the fact that The U.S. military 
posture in Asia in general and in South Korea in particular would be strengthened”102 
The Reagan administration regarded the Chun government as one of its key partners even 
though human rights in the ROK were not improved. With increasing Soviet threats, 
Reagan had to set the overarching goal as the winning the Cold War, unlike his 
predecessor. To secure allies’ strong support was crucial for the U.S. to contain the 
USSR’s expansion. Above all, Washington intended to strengthen the military 
relationship with South Korea, because President Reagan believed that “South Korea was 
to be a key element in the plan.”103 As the tension between the two Koreas was 
escalating, South Korea also needed the endorsement of the ROK’s major patron, the 
U.S. Since North Korea executed provocations such as Rangoon bombing, the U.S.’s 
                                                 




military support was essential for Seoul to deter Pyeongyang. Thus, the two countries 
aimed to reinforce the alliance again. 
Three U.S.-ROK summit meetings between President Reagan and Chun 
demonstrated that the U.S.-ROK alliance was stronger than before. President Chun 
visited the U.S. in January 1981 and in April 1985, and invited President Reagan to Seoul 
in November 1983. Specifically, the first summit meeting was regarded as a symbol of 
the strengthened U.S.-ROK alliance. In February 1981, President Reagan invited 
President Chun as the first foreign President to visit the White House. Many countries’ 
Presidents and politicians paid attention to this summit meeting. Since President Chun 
had cruelly suppressed the Gwangju democratization movement in May 1980, he was 
criticized by worldwide human rights organizations. Despite this criticism, the two 
Presidents exchanged their opinions on world affairs including the expansion of 
communism in Asia. Since Washington and Seoul shared an objective–the containment 
of the Soviet-bloc–both Presidents stressed the significance of the U.S.-ROK alliance; 
“President Reagan and President Chun pledged to uphold the mutual obligations 
embodied in the United States-Korea Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954.”104 In the summit 
meeting, President Reagan stated that the U.S. would abolish the plan of U.S. ground 
combat forces’ withdrawal from South Korea. The maintaining of the USFK assured 
Seoul of Washington’s intentions for the reinforcement of the alliance. President Chun 
also emphasized a firm combined defense posture in South Korea and intended to 
improve the two nations’ relationship, saying “Our two nations will march forward as 
mature partners.” Reagan’s pledge to protect South Korea was reaffirmed by U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Weinberger at the thirteenth SCM. The U.S. invitation of President 
Chun showed the U.S.’s unswerving commitment to the ROK. 
President Reagan officially visited Seoul in November 1983. The two Presidents 
reviewed security situations of Northeast Asia and international affairs. At the second 
meeting, President Reagan stressed that South Korea continued to back up the U.S. to 
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maintain the stability in the East Asia as well as the U.S.105 Reconfirming that the U.S. 
would not withdraw the USFK, President Reagan reiterated the strong commitment to 
repel any armed attack against South Korea. The two Presidents agreed to continue joint 
efforts for the improvement of the U.S.-ROK combined defense posture. In April 26, 
1985, President Chun visited Washington again. President Reagan’s aim was to tie its 
military relationship with South Korea more tightly. Stating that the U.S.-ROK mutual 
defense treaty was vital for the peace in Northeast Asia, Reagan announced, “The ties 
linking the Republic of Korea and the United States are many and strong.”106 President 
Chun agreed with Reagan, declaring the establishment of a close bilateral relationship. In 
three summit meetings, both presidents consistently reaffirmed their commitment to 
peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula and the East Asia.  
Compared to the prior period, the number of the two countries’ summit meetings 
increased. U.S. Presidents held three summit meetings with ROK President Roh Tae-
woo, who was a successor of President Chun. In these three summit meetings, Both 
Presidents consistently reaffirmed their commitment to peace and stability in the Korean 
Peninsula and the East Asia. While only two summit meetings were held in Seoul in the 
1970s, the U.S. and ROK presidents had six summit meetings in both Seoul and 
Washington in the 1980s. The Reagan administration had four meetings, and the Bush 
administration organized two. The increased number of summit meetings and 
Washington’s invitations to ROK Presidents demonstrated strong U.S.-ROK 
partnership.107 
In summary, President Reagan deemphasized Carter’s human rights campaign 
against authoritarian regimes in order to establish a broad anti-communist bloc. As a 
result, the three U.S.-ROK summit meetings were held, which contributed to establishing 
a solid foundation for strong ties between the two countries. In all meetings, the two 
                                                 
105 Presidential Library and Museum, “Joint Statement Following Discussions with President Chun 
Doo Hwan of the ROK,” http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/111483a.htm. 
106 Presidential Library and Museum, “Remarks Following Discussions with President Chun Doo 
Hwan of the ROK,” http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/42685f.htm. 
107 Kwak, “Alliance Institionalization,” 131. 
 37 
presidents consistently made an effort to further consolidate their partnership. Therefore, 
with respect to the first indicator, alliance cohesion was strong again in the 1980s. 
2. Combined Exercises and Operations 
In the 1980s, combined exercises and operations also showed strong alliance 
cohesion. After the CFC took over planning and supervising combined trainings, the 
three major exercises–the UFL, the Foal Eagle (F/E) exercise, and the Team Spirit–were 
developed further.108 In order to deter North Korea and enhance combined operational 
readiness, diverse U.S.-ROK combined exercises and trainings were carried out. In 
addition, to further capabilities of combined operations, the ROK Navy joined the Rim of 
the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC).  
Introducing the technique of the Computer-Based Military Simulation called “war 
games,” the U.S. and ROK developed the UFL. The U.S. and ROK military could test 
their operation plan’s effects and find unexpected errors in their integrated operation 
plans.109 In the past, the UFL had been conducted, depending on discussion and 
interaction between commanders and their staff. However, in the 1980s, the advance of 
computer and technology contributed to increasing the exercise’s effectiveness. The war 
game model objectively evaluated commanders’ orders and operation plans. Thus, the 
two militaries could attain proficiency in combined procedures of crisis management.  
Contents of the F/E were largely expanded. The exercise had focused, in the past, 
on training Special Forces in combined special operations. However, as the CFC was 
established in 1979, participating troops were increased, and operation areas were not 
confined to the rear area but expanded to the front area.110 Specifically, in 1986, the two 
countries added the anti-terrorism exercise to the F/E to prepare for the 1986 Seoul Asian 
game. The F/E demonstrated strong military and political relationships between 
Washington and Seoul.   
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Since 1976, the Team Spirit exercise had been conducted to improve the 
interoperability of the U.S. and ROK forces and to deter North Korea’s offensive-
oriented military actions. In the 1970s, contents of the exercise were confined to 
amphibious operations, but in the 1980s, two major training components were newly 
added to this exercise: air maneuvers such as air assaults and ground trainings like river 
crossings.111 With increased exercising components, the period of the exercise was 
extended. While it was ten days in the 1970s, the period was prolonged to seventy days in 
the 1980s. In addition, as about 200,000 U.S. and South Korean troops participated in the 
exercise, Team Spirit became a large-scale field maneuver at the Division level.    
Seoul decided to join the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) in the late 
1980s. The RIMPAC was a combined sea maneuver exercise in the Pacific Ocean. The 
U.S. Third Fleet planned and supervised this exercise, and the ROK, Australia, Canada, 
Chile, England, and Japan participated. The exercise’s goal was to improve mutual 
military cooperation among Pacific countries. In order to ensure the safety of sea lines of 
communication on major maritime routes, participating countries improved their common 
operation plans and readiness.112 Following Seoul’s decision, the ROK Navy joined in 
this exercise from 1990. In the 1980s, the range of the U.S. and ROK’s military 
cooperation stretched multilateral exercises beyond bilateral trainings.  
In short, the strengthening of the UFL, the F/E, and the Team Spirit exercise and 
the ROK’s participation in the RIMPAC contributed to improving both armed forces’ 
interoperability and facilitating the exchange of know-how on North Korea’s diverse 
armed provocations.113 Therefore, these exercises fostered combined operations and 
military capabilities to protect the ROK, which resulted in strong alliance cohesion. 
3. The Institutionalization of the Alliance 
In the 1980s, the third indicator, the institutionalization of the alliance, 
demonstrated the strong cohesion of the alliance. The U.S. and ROK developed the SCM 
                                                 
111 Jee, “Alliance Security Culture and Alliance Cohesiveness,” 122. 
112 ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2012 Defense White Paper, 336. 
113 Kwak, “Alliance Institionalization,” 147. 
 39 
into an advanced communication channel. Since the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the 
ROK Defense Minister discussed all the security issues in the Korean Peninsula, the 
SCM was transformed into a comprehensive security meeting. When Washington and 
Seoul initiated the SCM in 1968, the role of the SCM was confined to restatement of their 
presidents’ announcements. In the SCM, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the ROK 
Defense Minister did not have authority to decide military strategies and guidelines on 
key security issues. However, in the 1980s, the SCM evolved into a “substantial policy 
consultative meeting.”114 The U.S. Secretary and the ROK Minister were able to design 
countermeasures against their shared security threats; “It found solutions to major 
pending security issues based on mutual consultations and explored the direction of long-
term development of their bilateral military relations.”115 Joint communiques issued just 
after the SCM became significant guidelines for the two countries’ security agencies 
including the CFC and the USFK. Considering that the communication channel was 
intensified, the two countries’ military relationship was tied. 
The U.S. and ROK advanced logistics and maintenance programs to maintain 
their high interoperability. Washington and Seoul agreed to build three new programs to 
make wartime logistics support systems sophisticated: the Wartime Host Nation Support 
(WHNS), the revision of the War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA), and the Mutual 
Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA).116 The two countries’ shared aim was to enable 
the U.S. armed forces in the U.S. mainland to deploy into South Korea more quickly. 
Since many troops of the USFK were withdrawn from South Korea in the 1970s, the U.S. 
would have to transport many soldiers and a great deal of military equipment in wartime. 
In addition, the two countries’ military interoperability was enhanced, because South 
Korea exclusively purchased U.S. arms, and the number of combined exercises was 
increased.  
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The major purpose of the WHNS was to provide South Korea’s military and 
civilian resources, such as trains and buses, for U.S. forces deployed to South Korea. In 
order to move the U.S. military into battlefields, the two countries specified transporting 
plans within South Korea. The WHNS included two major missions. One was the 
reception and onward movement of the U.S. military, and the other was transporting 
military supplies to the frontline for sustaining their units’ war capabilities.117 The U.S. 
Secretary of Defense and the ROK Defense Minister exchanged their opinions at the 17th 
SCM in 1985 and finally agreed to create the WHNS at the 19th SCM in 1987.  
The two nations revised the WRSA. The WRSA referred to the U.S.’s war reserve 
stocks, such as weapons, ammunitions, and food supplies, in its allied countries. The 
WRSA in South Korea provided military supplies only for the USFK and augmented 
U.S. military. However, the revision of the WRSA allowed the USFK to provide military 
materials for the ROK military; the two nations signed the Critical Requirements 
Deficiency List (CRDL) as a provision of the WRSA. Because ordinary arms sales 
should be reviewed and approved by the U.S. Congress, South Korea would have 
difficulty providing required military equipment to its military in the case of an early 
stage of a war. South Korea’s military industries did not have a high enough level of 
technology in weapon systems and facilities to produce a massive amount of military 
supplies. Two revisions of the WRSA in 1982 and 1984 enabled the ROK to purchase the 
U.S. arms without waiting for the U.S. Congress’s approval. Prompt resupply of war 
materials would be possible at the early stage of war.  
The MLSA was signed in 1988 to improved mutual logistics support between the 
U.S. and ROK armed forces. As the two countries’ military relationship was loser, the 
number of combined exercises, trainings, and operations greatly increased. As a result, 
requirements for unexpected supply or maintenance were raised. The MLSA’s goal was 
to respond to these demands more quickly and effectively; “The mutual logistics support 
process begins with a request from one party, and the other party provides support, which 
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shall be paid back with materials of the same kind, service, or cash.”118 The MLSA 
contributed to improving both armed forces’ operational sustainability.  
In summary, in the 1980s, the U.S. and ROK evolved the SCM into a superior 
comprehensive security meeting and improved logistics systems by establishing three 
agreements. The SCM’s reinforcement led the two nations to understand each other’s 
intentions and facilitate cooperation. The advance in logistics systems contributed to 
improving interoperability. As a result, alliance cohesion became stronger than during the 
prior period. 
4. Combined Military Capability 
The fourth indicator, combined military capability, showed that alliance cohesion 
was becoming strong in the 1980s. The two states spent billions of dollars on a combined 
defense posture to improve their interoperability. President Reagan’s guidelines led the 
U.S. government to consistently provide a great deal of military aid for the ROK military 
through diverse supporting programs. President Reagan believed that the modernization 
of the ROK would contribute to protecting U.S. security by checking the Soviet Union’s 
expansion. In return, South Korea started to support the expense of the USFK from 1989 
with its rapid economic growth.   
At the summit meeting in 1981, ROK President Chun announced that South 
Korea would improve its self-reliant defense capabilities through the modernization of its 
armed forces. President Reagan confirmed that the U.S. would support the ROK’s 
modernization plan by increasing the amount of military aid to South Korea, providing 
defense industry technologies, and selling the newest weapon systems.119 Regarding the 
ROK’s military modernization, the shared purpose of Presidents Reagan and Chun was to 
make North Korea abandon any form of aggression by upgrading the U.S-ROK 
combined military strength.  
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Following President Reagan’s intentions, the U.S. government planned three grant 
programs to back up the ROK military’s modernization: the military Assistance Program 
(MAP), the Military Assistance Service Fund (MASF), and the International Military 
education and Training (IMET) program. In the 1980s, the total cost of these three 
programs was over $366 million.120 Considering that the total budget of U.S. foreign 
security assistance was $1,813 million, South Korea received 20.9%. Given that in the 
1970s, the ROK’s proportion was just 13%, the U.S. increased its commitment to South 
Korea in the 1980s.121 Although the U.S.’s economic recession and the failure of the 
Vietnam War caused the U.S. government to reduce the amount of foreign aid, the U.S. 
government provided a large amount of military support to South Korea. The U.S. 
Congress also backed military aid to the ROK. It approved the increased of the Foreign 
Military Sales loan from $129 million in 1980 to $160 million in 1981 and to $167.5 
million in 1982.122 Washington allowed Seoul to purchase cutting edge military weapon 
systems including “36 F-16 Air fighters, air defense systems, M55-1 light tanks, and 
other military hardware.”123 Since the U.S. DOD sold its advanced arms only to its major 
allies, arms sales demonstrated that the U.S. recognized the ROK as its key ally. 
In order to enhance a combined defense posture, the U.S. made an effort to not 
only modernize the ROK military but also strengthen the USFK’s capabilities. The U.S. 
upgraded the 2nd Infantry Division’s equipment overall. The U.S. DOD redeployed A-10 
aircrafts to improve anti-armor capability, increased the number of F-16 air fighters for 
superiority in the air, and upgraded the early warning systems. The USFK presence 
without additional withdrawals and its constant improvement of its capabilities sent a 
strong signal that the U.S. commitment was continued to protect the ROK from the 
DPRK’s offensive operations. 
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In the 1980s, South Korea achieved a rapid economic growth known as “the 
miracle of the Han River.” Washington required Seoul to increase its proportion of the 
costs for the station the USFK.124 At the 20th SCM, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and 
the ROK Defense Minister signed the agreement of defense cost-sharing; South Korea 
started to provide monetary support for the expense of stationing U.S. troops in South 
Korea.125 As a result, Seoul provided $45 million in 1989 for the USFK. The costs of the 
ROK’s military security started to shift from Washington to Seoul. The ROK reinforced 
its commitment to the USFK by providing economic support, which contributed to 
strengthening alliance cohesion. Therefore, in the 1980s, alliance cohesion became 
stronger than during the prior period.  
C. CONCLUSION 
In the 1980s, alliance cohesion was strong. After the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan, the U.S. and the USSR restarted their military competition called the 
“second Cold War.” The sharp military confrontation led U.S. foreign policy to roll back 
to hard-liner deterrence. Announcing “the Reagan Doctrine,” President Reagan 
reintroduced diverse containment policies including the SDI. He not only strengthened 
U.S. military might but also intended to reinforce the U.S.’s alliances; “Washington’s 
policies regarding the USSR must take into account the requirements of maintaining 
stable alliance relations.”126 To obtain allied countries’ support was essential for 
Washington in order to contain the Soviet Union’s expansion. 
Based on changed security environments, the four indicators in the 1980s clearly 
demonstrated that alliance cohesion became stronger than during the prior period. With 
regard to the first indicator, official statements and documents by leaders, the 
inauguration of President Ronald Reagan in 1981 led the U.S. and ROK to establish more 
close military relationship than ever before. President Reagan focused on strengthening 
this alliance to check the USSR. As a result, six summit meetings were held, compared to 
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two summit meetings in the 1970s. The two nations’ presidents consistently emphasized 
the significance of the alliance. President Reagan affirmed the U.S. commitment to South 
Korea by cancelling the withdrawal plan of the USFK. ROK Presidents Chun and Roh 
replied to the U.S. commitment by supporting the U.S. leadership in East Asia. 
The second indicator, combined exercises and operations, showed strong alliance 
cohesion. The strengthening of combined exercises and operations–the UFL, the F/E, the 
Team Spirit exercise, and the ROK’s participation in the RIMPAC–contributed to 
improving the interoperability of the two nations’ armed forces. Introduction of computer 
based training techniques led the U.S. and ROK commanders, staff, and troops to 
enhance their effectiveness in exercises. In addition to having diverse exercises, both 
armed forces exchanged know-how about how to fight North Korea and understood their 
partners’ strategies and military tactics.  
The third indicator, institutionalization of the alliance, was greatly developed. 
Since the SCM evolved into the most important security communication channel, it 
started to address all kinds of security issues and decided strategies and responses. The 
development of the SCM contributed to enhancing the two countries’ security 
cooperation. Three U.S.-ROK logistics support programs were created to improve war 
fighting capability and guarantee war-sustaining capabilities. The U.S. could deploy its 
armed forces from outside military bases to the Korean peninsula, and South Korea could 
receive required military materials and maintenance supporting from the USFK. Thus, 
the level of cooperation and interoperability between the two nations was raised. 
The last indicator, combined military capabilities, showed the U.S.’s high interest 
in the alliance, which resulted in strong alliance cohesion. The U.S. planned diverse 
military aid programs and augmented the USFK’s weapon systems. Furthermore, the 
U.S.-ROK military relationship evolved into a partnership because the two countries 
started to talk about defense cost-sharing. As the ROK covered some costs for the 
USFK’s stationing, the military relationship between the two countries was solidified.  
In the 1980s, the four indicators together demonstrated that alliance cohesion was 
becoming stronger than the 1970s. Since the Soviets’ threats against the U.S. had greatly 
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increased, the U.S. aimed to strength the alliance. The main driver, encouraging the two 
countries to strengthen alliance cohesion, was changes in dominant U.S. threat 
perception, the second Cold War. 
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IV. THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR IN THE 1990S 
A. THE U.S. DOMINANT SECURITY OUTLOOK 
U.S. President George H. W. Bush and USSR leader Mikhail Gorbachev held a 
summit meeting at Malta in December 1990. At this summit, Bush and Gorbachev 
declared an end to the Cold War. Thus, only the U.S. remained a superpower. In the late 
1980s, Gorbachev concluded that the Soviets would no longer continue their competition 
with the U.S. The economic gap between the two countries was becoming wider, and the 
U.S. had planned the SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) for military superiority. Moscow 
could not catch up with Washington’s economic and military power. In the end, the 
Soviets were disestablished, and “worldwide American hegemony” emerged.127 Since it 
did not have external security threats, Washington focused on dealing with domestic 
problems and improving the U.S. economy.  
1. Major Driving Events 
In the 1990s, the U.S. did not have a severe security threat, because its rival, the 
USSR, collapsed. The Soviet Union’s satellite regimes started to collapse one by one 
after 1989. Specifically, on November 9, the Berlin Wall, which was a symbol of the 
Cold War, was torn down, and the two Germanys achieved unification. After two years 
later, Mikhail Gorbachev officially announced the disestablishment of the Soviet Union, 
which meant the end of the Cold War.  
In the late 1980s, the Soviets faced crises such as economic recession and the 
failure of the Third World competition. To deal with these perils, Gorbachev greatly 
reformed its domestic and foreign policies rather than continue to confront the U.S. He 
announced “the new thinking.” Its overarching objective was to reduce threats from the 
U.S.128 The new thinking consisted of two principles; one was glasnost (openness) in the 
politic, and the other was perestroika (restructuring) in the economy. Glasnost 
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guaranteed the Soviet people’s political freedoms such as freedom of the press. To admit 
opponents’ opinions would end the dictatorship of the Communist party. Perestroika led 
to significant changes in economic systems. By allowing an open market, free private 
commercial transactions and foreign trades were facilitated. Under the pro-western 
atmosphere, civilian movements in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany succeeded in 
removing authoritarian regimes and establishing democracy. Gorbachev accepted 
overthrow of his satellite communist regimes: “Gorbachev did not send a single tank into 
any East European country [to protect communist governments].”129 
Gorbachev concentrated on renegotiating arms control with the U.S. The Soviet 
Union had more nuclear weapons, but strained to match the U.S. military posture more 
broadly. Although some U.S. politicians doubted Gorbachev’s intentions, the White 
House began to negotiate arms control with Moscow. Washington needed to prevent 
hardliners of the Soviet Union from grasping the power and restarting military 
confrontations.130 As a result, the two nations signed two significant negotiations: 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and Strategic Arms Reduction (START). 
The two agreements led the two countries to reduce the number of strategic nuclear 
weapons from about 30,000 to fewer than 7,000.131 Melanson argued, “These treaties 
effectively ended the EAST-WEST military confrontation of almost a half-century.”132 
As a result, the Soviet Union’s influence on Eastern countries was greatly decreased. 
Although Russia still possessed nuclear warheads, it no longer maintained an influential 
status in the world, and the U.S. became the sole superpower in the 1990s. 
2. U.S. Perception and Response 
The U.S. security environment was greatly changed, because the Cold War ended 
in 1990. In the late 1980s, the U.S. cautiously reacted to Gorbachev’s suggestions that 
emphasized peaceful coexistence through arms control. As the USSR reduced its nuclear 
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warheads and admitted democratic movements in the Eastern bloc, the U.S. started to 
cooperate with the Soviet Union. In 1990, Gorbachev declared the disestablishment of the 
USSR. The U.S. had to reconsider and adjust its global deterrence strategy, because its 
foreign policies’ assumptions and strategies obsolete. Above all, “The U.S. is both 
unwilling and unable to serve as policeman of the world.”133 Americans no longer agreed 
to spend billions of dollars on foreign policy projects and urged the government to return 
to isolationism.134  
Since the Soviets’ threat fully reduced, security no longer was the top priority of 
the Clinton administration. President Bill Clinton strengthened economic institutions 
rather than security agencies. President Clinton reflected this changed U.S. citizens’ 
attitude in his policies: “Unlike the experience of his Cold War predecessors, domestic 
issues defined Clinton’s presidency.”135 Since he was a presidential candidate, Clinton 
had been interested in social and economic matters rather than foreign issues. Joseph 
Nye, Jr. supported this view: “As the sole superpower, Americans did not pay much 
attention to foreign policy.”136 As Clinton was inaugurated as President in 1993, 
Washington redefined U.S. foreign policy and security agencies’ roles to meet the new 
era’s demands.137  
The authority of security agencies such as the National Security Council (NSC) 
decreased. The U.S. Congress and Americans doubted the effectiveness of the NSC in the 
new era. Since U.S. security environment greatly changed, the U.S. needed to create a 
new pivotal agency; The NSC had emphasized military operations to deal with national 
security concerns, the council could not be adequate to manage economic and ecological 
                                                 
133 Howard J. Wiarda, US Foreign and Strategic Policy in the Post-Cold War Era (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1996), viii. 
134 Joseph S. Nye Jr, “The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective,” in The 
Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence, eds. Eugene R. Wittkopf and James 
M. McMormick (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012): 29. 
135 Melanson, American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War, 233. 
136 Nye, “Future of American Power,” 17. 
137 Vincent A. Auger, “The National Security Council System After the Cold War,” in US Foreign 
Policy After the Cold War, eds. Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1997): 42 
 50 
issues.138 Military actions, personnel, and equipment were largely decreased: “[The plan] 
reduce the armed services from 1.7 million to 1.4 million personnel, the number of navy 
carriers from fourteen to twelve, and  air wings from twenty-four to twenty.”139 Although 
the U.S. Secretary of Defense consistently argued the importance of military 
interventions by conducting several operations, his proposal could not delay the pace of 
reduction under without a clear security threat. Budget of security agencies including the 
DOD, the NSC, and the CIA were sharply cut. 
President Clinton hesitated to intervene in foreign issues. Although the world 
hoped that the U.S. would handle humanitarian problems in Somalia and Haiti, Clinton 
was seen by some observers to regard these as “inconvenient public relations problems,” 
not as security problems.140 He conditionally approved military actions against 
Yugoslavia and Iraq; The Pentagon could conduct military operations only by using air 
strikes. For the Clinton administration, to reduce the risk of any combat casualties was 
much more important than decisive winning through ground operations. Its aim was to 
avoid facing severe opposing public opinions. 
After President Clinton reformulated U.S. priorities, economic issues became the 
most significant policies. He planned the establishment of the Economic Security Council 
by defining economic interests as his administration’s foreign policy.141 The council 
aimed to boost its economy by facilitating foreign trade; it encouraged the U.S.’s 
companies to invest to foreign market.142 Since it focused on international trade, the 
council could control foreign policies as well as domestic policies. The policy was 
continued for a while. President George W. Bush also gave a top priority to economy 
rather than security when he was running and firs elected. President Bush shared a 
perspective on security threats with his predecessor. He could not obtain the legitimacy to 
act as the worldwide peacemaker and to expand its security bureaucracies. 
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The change in dominant U.S. threat perception influenced the relationship 
between the U.S. and the ROK. Without a clear and grave enemy in East Asia, the U.S. 
was less interested in its alliances with Asian countries. The U.S.’s significant agenda 
was not security but the economy. Washington’s intentions negatively influenced the 
U.S.-ROK alliance. The reduced Soviet threats indicated that “developments on the 
Korean Peninsula are less relevant to the U.S.”143 South Korea no longer was a vital 
region, and the U.S. regarded the ROK as “one component of a larger mission to ensure 
stability in the Far East.”144  
B. THE COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE 
The collapse of the USSR led to drastic changes in the U.S.-ROK alliance. The 
U.S. did not need to maintain the strong alliance with South Korea. Seoul could not 
provide great benefits with the U.S., because the U.S.’s top priority was to recover its 
economy. The four indicators demonstrated that the shift in dominant U.S. threat 
perception influenced the cohesion of the U.S.-ROK alliance.   
1. Official Statements and Documents by Leaders 
Based on changed security environments, U.S. legislators and Presidents did not 
need to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance as before. In July 1989, the U.S. Senator Sam 
Nunn submitted the Nunn-Warner Amendment, which required the government to re-
evaluate U.S. military commitment to East Asia. He emphasized that the U.S. should 
readjust its military bases, strength structure, and missions because the Cold War, in fact, 
had ended peacefully. The Amendment demanded the U.S. administration reduce the 
number of the USFK immediately and negotiate a gradual withdrawal of the USFK with 
Seoul. U.S. Congress passed the Nunn-Warner Amendment and begun to press for the 
withdrawal of the USFK. The U.S. Department of Defense reassessed U.S. armed forces’ 
missions and locations, reflecting the Soviet Union’s diminished security threats and 
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defense budget cuts. In the end, President Bush signed the East Asia Strategic Initiative 
(EASI) in April 1990.145 The EASI proposed to “transition U.S. forces on the peninsula 
from a leading role to a supporting role.”146 It also required the South Korean 
administration to increase its proportion of defense cost-sharing.147 Through the EASI, 
the U.S. aimed to decrease its commitment to this alliance. William J. Crowe argued that 
the EASI stemmed from the American post-Vietnam strategy to confine the role of the 
U.S. armed forces.148 Allied partners had to bear greater responsibilities for their own 
defense by maintaining the large ground combat with a lot of budget, and the U.S. 
provided limited supports through its Air Force and Navy.  
In compliance with the Nunn-Warner Amendment and the EASI, the U.S. 
officially announced plans to reduce the USFK. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney 
planned to reduce the number of the USF in the early 1990s.149 The Pentagon designed a 
10-year and 3-phase gradual reduction. At the 22nd SCM in November 1990, U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney officially informed the plan of the USFK’s 
reduction.150 As a result, about 7,000 U.S. forces withdrew from the ROK to the U.S. 
Although Seoul required Washington to stop or hold the withdrawal of the USFK, 
it was not desperate to cancel this policy. Since Seoul had greatly developed its economy 
and normalized its diplomatic relationships with communist countries, it considered that 
the certain amount of the USFK would be sufficient to prevent North Korea from 
executing provocations. In the 1980s, the ROK succeeded in achieving double-digit 
economic growth; it was known as “the miracle of Han River.” Based on the strong 
economic power, the ROK Roh Tae-woo administration initiated Nordpolitik (northern 
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diplomacy), in the late 1980s. This policy’s purpose was to normalize its relationship 
with communist countries like China and Russia. Seoul intended to isolate Pyeongyang 
politically and enlarge the economic gap between the two Korea. Seoul confidently 
evaluated that it could unify with North Korea by diplomatic and economic means 
beyond deterring Pyeongyang’s provocations. Although South Korea was still a client of 
the U.S., it gradually expressed its intentions on foreign policy toward North Korea and 
diverse alliance issues. This resulted in intra-alliance tension, which weakened the 
alliance.  
2. Combined Exercises and Operations 
In the 1990s, four important U.S.-ROK combined exercises were the Ulchi Focus 
Lens (UFL), the Foal Eagle (F/E), Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and 
integration (RSOI), and the Team spirit (TS). Since the commander of the CFC possessed 
the wartime OPCON, the U.S. had a responsibility for exercises to prepare war. However, 
as the U.S. changed its role from a leading role to a supporting role, it planned to transfer 
its responsibility for combined exercises and operations to the ROK military. As 
reviewed below, the evolution of these combined exercises during this period 
demonstrated the U.S. low commitment to the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
Since the 1990s, the UFL had been transformed into a comprehensive exercise by 
connecting the South Korean government’s crisis management training, the Choongmu 
Plan. The UFL became the integrated exercise including both the military and the 
government. It consisted of two parts. The first part focused on increasing cooperation 
between the military and the government. ROK government officials, both U.S. and ROK 
military troops, and many business companies for mobilization were participated in the 
first part of the UFL. The second one was a military-oriented exercise for the two 
countries’ combined armed forces. The CFC controlled and managed the exercise. 
However, the ROK Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) began to lead the UFL. Through many 
consultations and discussions with the CFC, the ROK JCS started to plan, execute, and 
review the UFL. The ROK JCS’s leading role separated exercises from operations, 
because the CFC commander still had wartime OPCON. Although the ROK controlled 
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exercises, the CFC would lead operations in contingencies. Considering that exercises 
should be the same as operations, the effectiveness of exercises greatly decreased. 
The Foal Eagle (F/E) exercise was an annual US-ROK combined field maneuver. 
Its aim was to improve the combined operational posture. By developing combined 
Special Forces’ capabilities, the two countries deterred North Korea’s war provocations 
and exchanged their significant lessons. When the Team Spirit was fully cancelled (see 
below), the F/E became the biggest combined field training exercise (FTX). More 
military troops participated in the F/E, and its training contents were expanded: chemical 
decontamination operations, rear area defense, and noncombatant evacuations.151 
Regional or global conflicts, such as the Persian Gulf War and the Kosovo incident, were 
involved in the F/E. These contents were closely related to the U.S. military’s missions 
but the ROK armed forces did not involve them into its military duties. The interested 
area was not limited in the Korean Peninsula, but was enlarged into the Asia-Pacific 
region.  
The two countries agreed to newly establish the RSOI exercise in 1994, which 
demonstrated the U.S. objective. The U.S. military strategy toward South Korea focused 
on augmenting its forces in contingency rather than maintaining sufficient troops in South 
Korea. The RSOI included “the processes of reception, staging, movement to the forward 
area, and integration of U.S. augmentation forces that would be deployed.”152 The ROK 
DOD, JCS, the CFC, USFK participated in the exercise. This exercise clearly showed the 
U.S. role’s changed from leading to supporting. 
The Team Spirit exercise had contributed to deterring North Korea’s offensive-
oriented military actions by demonstrating the strong U.S.-ROK security cooperation. Its 
main scenario was to protect the South from the North’s invasion and take over 
Pyeongyang city through counter attack operations. In 1991, the exercise was scaled 
down due to the U.S.’s participation in Persian Gulf War and defense budget cuts. North 
Korea repeatedly condemned the Team Spirit exercise and strongly demanded the two 
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nations to cancel it. Since Team Spirit provided the two nations with opportunities to plan 
and practice an attack against North Korea, the two armed forces could find errors in their 
plan and gain proficiency. However, in 1992, Team Spirit was suspended to encourage 
Pyeongyang to accept international inspections about its suspected nuclear facilities. Due 
to Pyeongyang’s denial to nuclear inspections, the two nations resumed Team Spirit in 
1993. However, Washington and Seoul agreed to suspend the 1994 Team Spirit exercise, 
because they considered that soft-approach would be more effective to deal with North 
Korea’s nuclear problem. The two countries intended to encourage Pyeongyang to 
receive the IAEA inspection. Subsequently, the Team Spirit exercises no longer have 
been held to provide the DPRK with an incentive to abandon nuclear weapons.153 
Considering that the exercise had been demonstrated strong alliance cohesion, the 
cancellation damaged the defense readiness of the U.S. and ROK forces. 
In summary, as the U.S. increasingly saw itself as providing a supporting role in 
the U.S.-ROK alliance, the responsibility for combined exercises and operations was 
transferred to the ROK. This transition, combined with cancellation of the Team Spirit 
exercise, produced overall weaker alliance cohesion. 
3. The Institutionalization of the Alliance 
The U.S. and ROK agreed to transfer peacetime OPCON from the CFC to the 
ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The U.S. and South Korea eliminated institutions that 
forced the USFK to engage in South Korea’s conflict in peacetime. The U.S. could 
decide interventions following its national interests. In addition, as the ROK took over 
several of the USFK’s missions, the U.S. reduced responsibilities for defending Seoul.  
In July 1950, President Rhee Syng-man decided to transfer operational control 
(OPCON) over the ROK armed forces to the United Nations Command (UNC) in order 
to defend South Korea and win the Korean War. The Commander-in-Chief of the UNC, 
General Douglas MacArthur, controlled and ordered the ROK military. After the Korean 
War, the ROK required that the UNC would keep OPCON over the ROK military. Its 
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aim was to ensure the UNC’s commitment to protect South Korea from North Korea.154 
When the CFC was created in 1978, the commander of the CFC took on OPCON. This 
ensured the U.S. commitment to South Korea. After the end of the Cold War, Seoul 
prepared to retake peacetime OPCON from the CFC. South Korea regarded the return of 
peacetime OPCON as achieving the first step of national self-reliance. Washington 
agreed with Seoul’s proposal to transfer peacetime OPCON, because it newly defined the 
USFK’s role as supporting.155 In addition, since U.S. foreign policies, including the 
Nunn-Warner Amendment and the EASI, required the government to reduce its costs and 
efforts to protect South Korea, the Bush administration accepted the ROK’s proposal. At 
the 26th SCM in October 1994, Washington and Seoul officially agreed to the transfer of 
peacetime OPCON.156 On 1 December 1994, peacetime OPCON was transferred to the 
Chairman of the ROK JCS from the CFC commander.  
After the transfer of peacetime OPCON, the U.S. did not take responsibility for 
South Korea’s security during peacetime. Peacetime OPCON that the CFC commander 
had exercised before forced the CFC and the USFK to intervene in North Korea’s 
infiltrations against South Korea. However, after the transfer, the CFC and the USFK did 
not have to engage in South Korea’s conflicts in peacetime.  
As Table 2 shows, the number of North Korea’s infiltrations in the 1990s was the 
highest of the decades included. Despite North Korea increased threats, U.S. military 
support and the USFK’s intervention were not mandatory. The transfer of peacetime 
OPCON drastically changed this alliance institution of the U.S. and the ROK, which 
weakened the combined defense posture. 
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Table 2.   Major cases of infiltrations and provocations157 
Year Number Contents 
1960s 6 e.g., 31 commandos assault near Cheongwadae 
1970s 7 e.g., Ax murder incident at Panmunjom 
1980s 5 e.g., Korean Air flight (KAL 858) is blown up in midair 
1990s 10 e.g., submarine infiltration with the reconnaissance units  
 
Under peacetime OPCON, Seoul received missions from the USFK. The ROK 
Army was responsible for the Joint Security Area (JSA), and the ROK 3rd Army Corps 
defended the western part of the DMZ replacing the U.S. 3rd Brigade. In December 1992, a 
Korean four-star general, Ryu Byeng-hyun, was appointed as the Deputy Commander of 
the CFC and the Ground Component commander. In addition, as the US-ROK Combined 
Field Army (CFA) was disbanded, many U.S. troops left South Korea. While South Korea 
had more responsibility for its security, the U.S.’s missions were reduced. This reduced 
U.S. duties prevented the USFK from being involved in South Korea’s conflicts and even 
enabled the U.S. to refuse South Korea’s demands. Considering that an alliance institution 
compels a country to support its allies, alliance cohesion became weak. 
4. Combined Military Capability 
Although the U.S. was still the major arms seller to South Korea, Seoul made an 
effort to diversify its arms sources including Indonesia and Russia. Compared to the past 
during which South Korea exclusively purchased U.S. weapons, this effort was 
significant. As the South Korean economy had advanced, the U.S. and South Korea 
began to negotiate defense cost-sharing for the presence of the USFK. An appropriate 
level of defense cost-sharing between the U.S. and the ROK could contribute to 
solidifying the combined defense posture. However, the two countries differently defined 
the term “appropriate.”  
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South Korea had modernized its outdated weapon systems through the U.S.’s 
military aid, because it could not afford the costs of military upgrading. In the 1990s, 
although the U.S. no longer provided military aid, South Korea could finance to the 
necessary budget for its military modernization with its developed economic power. 
South Korea mainly purchased U.S. arms; in 1991, U.S. arms exceeded 60% of the total 
amount of arms expenditure. However, Seoul began to consider non-U.S. arms 
purchasing. Non-U.S. arms were normally cheaper than U.S. arms, and South Korea also 
had a chance to sell its arms reciprocally.158 For Seoul, obtaining economic interests was 
important. When South Korea purchased eight CN-235 transport planes from Indonesia, 
Indonesia bought South Korean trucks that had the same costs of the planes.159  
Because Russian President Boris Yeltsin perceived dealing with the ROK as 
desirable, the relationship between Seoul and Moscow developed into a close 
partnership.160 Based on the amicable atmosphere, Moscow became Seoul’s second 
largest military supplier after the U.S.161 In the late 1990s, Russia’s arms companies 
proposed diverse cutting edge weapon system for South Korea. In terms of costs and 
benefits, South Korea was interested in Russian arms; the price and terms of purchase 
met the ROK’s requirements. Victor D. Cha provided examples: “the Russian T-80 main 
battle tank is half the price of the U.S. M1A1 Abrams, and two-thirds the production cost 
of the domestic K-1 tank.”162 Moreover, core technologies would be transferred to from 
Russia to South Korea if Seoul bought Russian arms. This transfer of technology would 
contribute to develop the ROK’s domestic military technologies. The ROK and Russia 
signed a military technology agreement to strengthen their military cooperation. In 1999, 
South Korea planned to involve the Russian 636 Kilo submarine into the KSS-II project, 
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the ROK’s Navy modernization program.163 For South Korea, economic profits were as 
significant as interoperability with the U.S. 
Before 1991, the U.S. did not require defense cost-sharing for South Korea and 
even constructed military facilities in South Korea with no the ROK’s fund. Moreover, 
Washington provided unconditional financial and military support to Seoul. These U.S. 
actions were taken because Seoul’s economy was weak. However, in the 1990s, South 
Korea succeeded in developing its economy; some called this the “miracle of Han River.” 
Since South Korea enjoyed economic prosperity, the U.S. stopped offering unitary 
support for the ROK and demanded Seoul take more responsibility for its own security. 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney announced, “[The U.S.] should continue to 
urge South Korea to assume a greater share of financial support for U.S. forward 
deployed forces.”164 The U.S. no longer provided unconditional support. 
The U.S. strongly urged South Korea to increase its proportions of the defense 
cost-sharing. In 1991, at the 23rd SCM, the two nations’ defense ministers agreed to the 
first Special Measures Agreement (SMA) for the period of 1991–1995. The ROK should 
provide $150 million in 1991, annually increase its costs twenty percent, and pay $300 
million in 1995.165 In the second SMA, covering the period of 1996–1998, South Korea 
consistently increased its proportions of burden sharing: $330 million in 1996 and $363 
million in 1997. When the Asian Financial Crisis severely damaged the South Korean 
economy in 1997, the exchange rate soared to almost double. Considering the ROK’s 
difficulty in securing dollars, the two countries agreed to involve the Korean Won in 
cost-sharing since 1998, which altered the apparent dollar amount of the U.S. 
contribution (see Table 3).  
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Table 3.   Defense cost-sharing166 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
USD 
(million) 
$150 $180 $220 $260 $300 $330 $363 $135 
KRW 
(10 million) 
- - - - - - - 2,45 
 
The U.S. believed that considering South Korea’s strong economy, its 
requirement was quite reasonable. Compared to South Korea’s annual GDP growth, the 
increase of defense cost-sharing was low. In the 1990s, South Korea’s average annual 
GDP growth was about 7%, but its defense cost-sharing increased with 1.1% every 
year.167 In addition, given the total cost of stationing the USFK was over $2 billion 
annually,168 South Korea’s contributions to the USFK were still small: 8% in 1991 and 
18% in 1998. As Mark E. Manyin stated, the objective of the Pentagon was to increase 
South Korea’s share to at least 50%.169 However, South Korea disagreed with the U.S.’s 
definition of the term, “appropriate.”170 It considered that the U.S.’s demands for defense 
cost-sharing exceeded the ROK’s economic power. While its contributions to the USFK 
increased nearly 300%, the ROK’s total defense budget increased only about 100% from 
1991 to 1999.171 Compared to the ROK defense budget’s rate of increase, its increasing 
rate of contribution was too high.  
In sum, in the 1990s, South Korea began to take economic profits into account 
when it decided to purchase foreign arms. South Korea did not buy only U.S. arms for 
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interoperability. Since the two countries had different opinions on defense cost-sharing, 
intra-alliance tension took place. As a result, alliance cohesion became weak. 
C. CONCLUSION 
U.S. foreign policy greatly shifted in the early 1990s, because the two Germanies 
achieved unification in 1989, and the Soviet Union collapsed. After the end of the Cold 
War, no nation could balance the U.S.’s economic and military power. Although the U.S. 
had enjoyed its superior status in its foreign relationships, the U.S. government faced 
opposition in domestic environment. The U.S. Congress and the public urged its 
government to reduce its foreign interventions and commitment. The U.S. President, 
George H.W. Bush, declared the new foreign policy and planned to withdraw its military 
in East Asia to concentrate on domestic matters.  
 As the U.S. did not have a clear and grave threat, the U.S-ROK alliance cohesion 
became weak. The diminished Soviet threat led the U.S. to be less interested in the 
Korean Peninsula. South Korea became peripheral to the U.S. security interests. The U.S. 
began to evaluate the costs and risks of its commitment to the ROK, which resulted in 
weak alliance cohesion.  
The U.S. leading officials issued new foreign policies. Above all, the Nunn-
Warner Amendment and the EASI indicated that the U.S. less committed to South Korea. 
In addition, the two countries’ presidents had different perspectives on North Korea. 
While the U.S. preferred hard-liner approaches, the ROK emphasized inter-Korea 
cooperation through the Sunshine Policy. Thus, intra-alliance tension took place, which 
weakened alliance cohesion. 
With respect to the second indicator, combined exercises and operations, the U.S. 
transferred responsibility to South Korea. The ROK JCS led planning, executing and 
reviewing of exercises. This meant that operations and exercises were being separately 
controlled, because the CFC had responsibility for operations. The U.S. focused on 
exercising deployment of the U.S. armed forces in the mainland. Above all, the two 
nations agreed to halt Team Spirit exercises. Since the aim of this exercise was to prepare 
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for Pyeongyang’s war provocations, the two countries lost opportunities to improve their 
combined armed forces’ proficiency for war.  
The third indicator, alliance institutionalization, became the weakest of the four 
indicators. Although North Korea escalated tension in the Korean peninsula by executing 
many provocations, the U.S. agreed to transfer its peacetime OPCON to the ROK. The 
U.S. did not need to engage in South Korea’s security issues during peace time. The 
transfer of peacetime OPCON removed an important alliance institution. Therefore, with 
the third indicator, alliance cohesion became greatly weakened. 
Regarding the fourth indicator, combined military capabilities, South Korea 
diversified its arms sources. Seoul was a still major purchaser for U.S. arms, but its effort 
to decrease the extent of U.S. dependency was significant. In addition, the two nations 
negotiated their defense cost-sharing. Since neither country was satisfied about their 
proportions of defense cost-sharing, the two countries created intra-alliance tension. 
Thus, alliance cohesion became weak. 
In the 1990, these four indicators reflected the U.S.’s low commitment to the 
defense of the Korean Peninsula. The major security threats of the U.S. were domestic 
problem in the 1990s Thus, during this period, alliance cohesion was weak. The main 
driver, leading the two countries to weaken alliance cohesion, was change in dominant 
U.S. threat perception of the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
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V. GLOBAL TERRORISM THE FIRST DECADE OF THE 2000S 
A. THE U.S. DOMINANT SECURITY OUTLOOK 
September 11, 2001, became a significant turning point in all U.S. policies. 
Nineteen terrorists, who were connected to the Islamic extremist group al-Qaeda, 
executed suicide attacks against the twin towers of New York’s World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon by hijacking four flights. While the U.S. was not threatened by external 
forces in the 1990s, it had a clear security threat again in the first decade of the 2000s. To 
respond to this disastrous crisis, The U.S. President declared the policy of “War on 
Terrorism.”172  
1. Major Driving Events 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. had enjoyed its superpower status. 
No one could balance the U.S. military and economic power. However, on the morning 
of September 11, 2001, the U.S. security environment was drastically changed. The day 
was recorded as the deadliest in the U.S. history. Nineteen terrorists, who were connected 
to the Islamic extremist group al-Qaeda, executed suicide attacks against the twin towers 
of New York’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon by hijacking four flights.173 Two 
major sites were destroyed, and thousands of people died or were severely injured. The 
September 11 attack was a challenge to U.S. superiority, because the two targets 
represented the U.S.’s economic and military strength.174 Almost 3,000 people were 
killed, and many buildings in Lower Manhattan were destroyed. Considering that diverse 
infrastructures were destructed, the extent of damage was larger. Jason Bram calculated 
the total cost of the September 11 attack as $33 billion to $36 billion.”175 This attack 
aggravated the U.S. economy, which was already trapped in a serious recession. The 
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inter-American Development Bank (IADB) decreased the estimated U.S. economic 
growth from about four percent to one percent.176 Criminals in the attack were Islamic 
terrorists from Arab countries. They were associated with Saudi fugitive Osama bin 
Laden’s al-Qaeda terrorist group. By supporting and leading this attack, al-Qaeda 
demonstrated its intention to oppose the U.S. intervention in the Middle East’s issues. 
The terror was designed to retaliate against the U.S.’s support for Israel and the U.S 
military presence in the Middle East.177  
The end of the Cold War led the U.S. to become a superpower without a rival, and 
the U.S. enjoyed its superior status in the 1990s. However, the September 11 attack 
seriously threatened U.S. prosperity and security. Since 9/11 was the first foreign attack 
on the American Homeland in 60 years, the attack shocked the U.S. and the world.  
2. U.S. Perception and Response 
The September 11 attacks fundamentally changed U.S. foreign policy. As the U.S. 
mainland was directly attacked, the Bush administration transformed its primary 
signature from economic and environmental issues to traditional security matters. The 
U.S. reinforced its security departments again to deal with terrorism, and the vital 
interested region was shifted from East Asia to Middle East to cope with its security 
threat. President Bush described this attack as “the Pearl Harbor of the 21st century.”178 
One day after the attack, he declared war on terrorism, by stating, “we will not end until 
every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”179 Before 
September 11, 2001, the U.S. could not prioritize many foreign policy agendas, such as 
controlling immigration and stopping illicit trafficking in drugs. However, the war on 
terrorism became the top priority in foreign policy surpassing all agendas. The Bush 
administration announced that the U.S. would attack Afghanistan to kill Osama bin 
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Laden, disband his al-Qaeda terrorist group, and remove the Taliban regime that 
supported bin Landen. After the Afghanistan War, President Bush declared the “Bush 
doctrine,” which emphasized preemptive military operations. The security agencies such 
as the NSC and DOD had legitimacy to project its armed forces abroad, and their budget 
greatly increased. With the Bush doctrine, Washington decided to start the Iraq War to 
topple the Hussein regime. The Bush administration believed that disarmament of Iraq 
could contribute to terminating the root of terrorist networks and protecting the world 
from serious danger. 
The public and Congress backed up the Bush government. The U.S. citizens 
agreed that the U.S. played an active role in protecting its security and peace. They 
perceived international terrorist groups as its number-one security threat.180 The public 
provided strong support for a military approach to handle terrorism. It also endorsed the 
increase of security budgets. Congress unusually announced bipartisan support to the 
government. Although policy makers had different ideological preferences on foreign 
policy, the events of September 11 made patriotism dominate them. As Congress passed 
Senate Joint Resolution 23, the President had a legal authority to freely conduct military 
operations against terrorist organizations including nations.181 Specifically, Congress 
demonstrated its bipartisan support to President by approving the Iraq War with 
overwhelming margins.  
As for the U.S., the world’s only superpower, all regions of the world had their 
own distinctive importance. After September 11 attacks, the Middle East became the 
pivotal region. Under the “ABT (anybody but terrorists) principle,”182 the Bush 
administration carried out military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq to destroy all 
terrorist groups including al-Qaeda. In the first decade of the 2000s, the U.S. security 
threat was in the Middle East not in the Pacific-East Asia region.183 
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The changed dominant threat perception negatively influenced the security 
relationship between the U.S. and the ROK. Since the U.S. mainly found its targets in the 
Middle East countries such as Iraq, the Middle East became the U.S.’s the most vital 
region. On the other hand, regions other than the Middle East were less important for 
Washington.  
B. THE COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE 
The September 11 attacks led to drastic changes in the U.S.-ROK alliance. Since 
the U.S.’s most vital region was decided as the Middle East, Washington was less 
interested in East Asia issues including the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, as terrorism 
became the most significant threat to the U.S., the most important mission of the USFK 
was changed from protecting South Korea to dealing with terrorism in the Asia-Pacific 
region more broadly. The four indicators demonstrated that the shift in dominant U.S. 
threat perception influenced the cohesion of the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
1. Official Statements and Documents by Leaders
The September 11 attacks of 2001 brought remarkable changes in the U.S.-ROK 
alliance.184 President George W. Bush redefined its alliances to handle terrorism crises 
throughout the world. The U.S. DOD significantly changed the U.S.’s military strategy to 
wipe out international terrorist organizations and prevent the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction.185 In 2004, Washington announced its new grand strategy, the Global 
Posture Review (GPR). The GPR concentrated on stepping up U.S. strategic flexibility in 
order to cope with worldwide issues. It readjusted military structures of oversea-based 
forces. To respond to global adversaries’ unexpected security threats, the U.S. armed 
forces should not be fixed in specific area, but maintain high flexibility to rapidly project 
their military troops: “rather than fixating massive forces overseas, the U.S. focuses on 
expanding rapid force projection.”186  
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As the additional missions and duties were assigned to the USFK, it no longer 
focused only on defending the ROK. Following the GPR, the USFK was realigned to 
address a wider range of security problems, such as global terrorism, and maintained 
flexibility. Although the USFK played a symbolic role in reinforcing combined defense 
posture and improving the South Korea’s armed forces, it would be ready to project its 
forces out of South Korea. In addition, Washington designed the USFK reduction again 
to concentrate its military forces on the Iraq War. At the 36th SCM, U.S. Secretary of 
Defense declared the withdrawal of 12,500 U.S. troops in three stages by 2008 to detach 
some 2nd Division troops to Iraq.187 The USFK’s changes in its structure, mission, and 
the number would demonstrate Washington’s low commitment to the U.S.-ROK alliance, 
which weakened the combined defense posture in South Korea. The USFK’s pursuit of 
flexibility resulted in weak alliance cohesion. 
The terrorist attacks also challenged the foundation of the U.S.-ROK alliance in 
political sectors. The two nations had different perspectives on their foreign policies to 
North Korea.188 President Bush described North Korean as the member of Axis of Evil 
and perceived it as a possible threat. On the other hand, South Korean Presidents Kim 
Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun regarded North Koreans as the same Korean race rather 
than a main enemy; “Many in the South saw the North Korean as less of a threat and 
more of a needy neighbor.”189 President Kim declared the Sunshine policy that stressed 
“unilateral aid and political concession.”190 The South Korean government offered a 
large amount of fertilizer, food, and money. Seoul provided $3 billion for Pyeongyang 
through the Sunshine policy, which exceeded China’s foreign aid, $1.9 billion.191 Since 
the U.S. and ROK’s foreign policies became divergent, intra-alliance tension was again 
elevated. Therefore, with respect to the first indicator, alliance cohesion was still weak. 
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2. Combined Exercises and Operations 
In 2002, the number of a comprehensive U.S.-ROK combined exercise decreased 
from three to two. The RSOI exercise was carried out in alignment with the F/E. In 2008, 
the two combined exercises fundamentally changed, relating to discussion for the transfer 
of wartime OPCON. The title of the UFL exercise was altered to Ulchi Freedom 
Guardian (UFG), and the name of the RSOI/FE was changed to Key Resolve / Foal Eagle 
(KR/FE).  
The UFL became an integrated exercise including both the military and the 
government. Since the late 1990s, South Korea had led the UFL. In 2008, the ROK JCS 
officially planned, executed, and reviewed this exercise, and the USFK just supported 
South Korea armed forces. Reflecting both armed forces’ changed roles, the title of this 
exercise changed from the UFL to the UFG. The purpose of the UFG was different from 
that of the UFL. The UFL focused on the mastery of the Operations Plan 5027 (OPLAN 
5027) for the defense against a North Korean invasion.192 On the other hand, The UFG 
concentrated on improving operational capacity of ROK JCS and U.S. KORCOM.193 
Although North Korea escalated tension on the Korean Peninsula as well as in the East 
Asia by a nuclear test, the U.S. and South Korea emphasized the transfer of wartime 
OPCON, not preparation for Pyeongyang’s imminent threats.  
In 2002, the RSOI and the F/E were integrated. Since the purpose of each exercise 
was largely different, the effect of integration was not great. While the RSOI focused on 
deployment of the U.S. augmented troops, the F/E was a comprehensive field training 
exercise including special operations.194 Despite this difference in purposes, the U.S. and 
the ROK agreed to decrease combined exercises. In 2008, the RSOI/FE’s name changed 
to the KR/FE. The background and the purpose of this change were the same as the 
UFG’s name change, specifically to prepare the transfer of wartime OPCON. The ROK 
JCS definitely led combined exercises, and the USFK’s role was confined. Furthermore, 
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the KR/FE’s purpose was clearly different from the RSOI/FE. The two armed forces no 
longer exercised rear-area operations with combined Special Forces although the initial 
purpose of the F/E was to improve special operations. According to the 2010 ROK 
Defense White Paper, the two purposes of the KR/FE were “to gain proficiency in 
OPLAN procedures and to guarantee deployment of U.S. Augmentation Forces.”195 
Considering that the number of North Korea’s Special Forces was approximately 
200,000,196 the weak combined capabilities in the rear-area would threaten the security of 
South Korea.  
In the first decade of the 2000s, combined exercises became weaker in terms of 
number and contents. The RSOI and the F/E were integrated in one exercise. The two 
nations changed the title of the UFL to UFG and the RSOI/FE to KR/FE to show the 
decreased role of the USFK. The two nations also changed the exercises’ purposes from 
defending South Korea from an imminent North Korea’s threat to preparing for the 
transfer of wartime OPCON. In addition, as discussed in Chapter IV, the ROK JCS’s 
leading role in these two comprehensive exercises damaged the effectiveness of 
exercises. Therefore, alliance cohesion was still weak. 
3. The Institutionalization of the Alliance 
In the first decade of 2000s, the U.S. and South Korea agreed to the transfer of 
wartime OPCON and the ensuing abolition of the CFC. The disestablishment of the CFC 
would result in weak combined defense posture. Seong-whun Cheon described the CFC 
command structure as “the most effective command system.”197 Since this structure’s 
main characteristic was the “unity in command” system, the level of both armed forces’ 
integration was quite high. However, after disbanding the CFC, the two countries would 
control their own armed forces respectively without a united commanding structure. The 
most critical alliance institution, the CFC, would be eliminated.  
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Both the U.S. and South Korea had more significant national interests than the 
alliance. Washington was less interested in the Korean peninsula than in the Middle East 
region. By transferring wartime OPCON to South Korea, Washington could reduce its 
commitments to South Korea and concentrate on issues in the Middle East, such as 
terrorism. South Koreans desired an achievement of self-reliance. South Korea intended 
to obtain a strong and independent military status, because of its developed economy. 
Since Seoul regarded the transfer from the CFC to the ROK JCS as a symbol of self-
reliance, it repeatedly expressed its intentions in 2000–2008. Although the two nations 
had different national interests, they shared the same objective—the transfer of wartime 
OPCON and the ensuing disestablishment of the CFC. As a result, Washington and Seoul 
cooperatively and in full consultation agreed to a change that would damage the U.S.-
ROK alliance. 
On October 19, 2006, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and ROK 
Defense Minister Yoon Kwang Ung held the 38th SCM. U.S. Secretary Rumsfeld and 
ROK Minister Yoon reviewed the progress of wartime OPCON and confirmed the date 
of the transfer. Both signed the Roadmap for the New Alliance Military Structure in the 
Post-OPCON Transition Era. According this document, “The two countries will 
complete the wartime OPCON transition to the ROK forces after October 15, 2009, but 
no later than March 15, 2012.”198 Their agreement clearly demonstrated weak alliance 
cohesion. Just ten days before, South Korea’s critical threat, North Korea, escalated 
tensions beyond the Korean Peninsula, affecting the entire region. On October 9, 
Pyeongyang conducted a nuclear test, which threatened all of East Asia. Although the 
Secretary and the Minister strongly condemned North Korea’s nuclear test, they reached 
an agreement that the CFC would be disestablished, and U.S. Korea Command would be 
activated. Considering that the CFC had been a pivotal institution in defending South 
Korea, the disestablishment of the CFC would damage the U.S.-ROK alliance in the 
aspect of a command structure. Therefore, with respect to the third indicator, alliance 
cohesion was still weak in the first decade of the 2000s. 
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4. Combined Military Capability 
South Korea’s effort to diversify its arms’ resources had continued in the first 
decade of the 2000s. Specifically, the effort culminated in the Fighter eXperiment project 
(F-X). South Korea considered non-U.S. air fighters and compared them to the U.S.’s 
aircraft, the F-15K. Additionally, the issue of the ROK’s missile restriction caused intra-
alliance tension. South Korea required the U.S. to increase the ROK’s missile range, but 
the U.S. hesitated to accept Seoul’s demands. 
Although South Korea was a major buyer of U.S. arms, it increased purchasing of 
non-U.S. weapons. U.S. arms no longer were the top priority when the ROK MND 
decided on its weapon system. In 2000, Seoul negotiated arms purchasing with Israel. 
Since Israel provided cheap prices and the transfer of relating technology, Seoul bought 
100 Harpy Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and reviewed purchasing of Israeli 
defense missiles for its naval destroyer program.199 For South Korea’s first military 
satellite, French played a key role in supplying related technologies and components. 
Furthermore, in SAM-X air defense the ROK MND preferred Israeli and France weapon 
systems to the U.S. patriot missiles. U.S. missiles were expensive, and the U.S. offered 
strict conditions on the transfer of technologies. 
From 1998 to 2002, South Korea conducted the F-X project for its next generation 
fighter; the total budget reached $450 billion.200 In the previous F-X project, only U.S. 
avionic companies, General Dynamic with F-16 and McDonnell Douglas with F/A-18, 
were reviewed by the ROK MND. In this F-X project, the ROK considered Rafale of 
France, EF-2000 of Europe, Su-35 of Russia, and the American F-15K. Russia offered 
the transfer of avionic technologies and full servicing.201 The French Rafale obtained the 
highest score in the F-X committee’s evaluation.202 Despite competitive alternatives, the 
ROK selected the F-15K as its next generation fighter. South Korean media and civic 
groups strongly criticized the MND, because “selection was made under pressure from 
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the Bush administration.”203 U.S. Senator Christopher Samuel Bond visited Seoul with 
senators and Boeing’s vice president. They met ROK President Kim Young-sam and the 
ROK Defense Minister to stress the superiority of U.S. air fighters.204 The South Korea’s 
consideration of alternatives implied that pursuit for interoperability with the U.S. was 
not the only major determinant in the ROK’s decision.  
The U.S. and ROK had different perspectives on revising the ROK’s missile 
restriction. The 1979 agreement between the U.S. and the ROK confined South Korean 
missile ranges to 180 km. After North Korea showed its advanced missile technology in a 
Taepo-dong flight test, Seoul worried about security. The ROK required the U.S. to 
revise the 1979 agreement in order to deter North Korea. The U.S. agreed to extend the 
missile ranges from 180km to 300km, but asked for South Korea to receive the U.S.’s 
inspection on future developments.205 Seoul was quite dissatisfied with Washington’s 
response.  
In sum, South Korea still sought to diversify its arms supplies; pragmatism, such 
as price or transfer of technology, was more emphasized than before. Moreover, the U.S. 
and South Korea had different views on the revision of the ROK’s missile restriction, 
which caused intra-alliance tension. Therefore, alliance cohesion was still weak in the 
first decade of the 2000s. 
C. CONCLUSION 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, no nation could match the U.S.’s economic 
and military power. However, the year of 2001 became a pivotal turning point in U.S. 
foreign policy. Terrorists attacked the U.S. mainland by hijacking airplanes. U.S. citizens 
raged against this attack and required the government to deal with the crisis using all 
means including military operations. As a result, President George W. Bush declared “the 
War on terrorism” and started the Afghanistan War and Iraq War. The U.S.’s security 
threat was located not in the Asia-Pacific region but in the Middle East.  
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 The September 11 attack weakened the U.S.-ROK alliance, because the U.S. 
security threat was changed to Middle East countries related to terrorism.206 Since South 
Korea was geographically far from the Middle East, the U.S. was less interested in the 
Korean Peninsula. South Korea became peripheral to the U.S. security interests. The U.S. 
began to evaluate the costs and benefits of its commitment to the ROK, which resulted in 
weak alliance cohesion.  
Regarding the first indicator, the U.S. leading officials issued new foreign policies 
such as the Global Posture Review (GPR). Following the changes of U.S. military 
strategies, the USFK had to be ready to project its forces beyond the Korean peninsula. 
This meant the decrease of the U.S.’s commitments to South Korea. In addition, the two 
nations had different perspective on foreign policy toward North Korea. While the U.S. 
condemned North Korea with Middle East countries, South Korea did not perceived 
North Korea as its major enemy. Their opposing foreign policies resulted in intra-alliance 
tension. Therefore, alliance cohesion was still weak. 
With respect to the second indicator, combined exercises and operations, the U.S. 
reduced its responsibility and duties. The two nations agreed to decrease three 
comprehensive exercises to two exercises. They also changed the two exercises’ titles, 
which indicated that purposes of the exercises were to prepare for the transfer of wartime 
OPCON. Although North Korea threatened stability in East Asia, the U.S. and the ROK 
focused on preparing for the transfer, not on deterring North Korea. The dualistic 
commanding structure, exercises led by the ROK and the U.S.-led operations, greatly 
weakened the effectiveness of the combined defense posture. Thus, alliance cohesion was 
weak. 
The third indicator, alliance institutionalization, became the weakest of the four 
indicators. The two nations began to discuss the transition of wartime OPCON and the 
subsequent disestablishment of the CFC. The CFC acted as a symbol of the firm 
combined defense posture and guaranteed effective combined operations. To disband the 
CFC would damage the interoperability of the two countries’ armed forces. Although 
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North Korea escalated tension in the Korean peninsula by executing nuclear tests, the two 
countries confirmed that their plan for the transfer of wartime OPCON had not changed. 
The transfer of wartime OPCON would remove the most important alliance institution, 
which resulted in weak alliance cohesion. 
Regarding the fourth indicator, combined military capabilities, South Korea 
continued to diversify its arms suppliers. In major arms contracts, Seoul reviewed non-
U.S. weaponry and purchased Israeli and French weapons. The ROK’s F-X project 
implied that without reasonable price or reciprocal benefits, the ROK MND would not 
purchase U.S. arms including the F-15K. Pragmatism became as important as 
interoperability. In addition, the revision of the ROK’s missile restriction caused intra-
alliance conflict. The ROK required longer missile range, but the U.S. conditionally 
accepted the ROK’s demands, requiring full U.S. inspection on South Korea’s future 
development. As a result, alliance cohesion was still weak. 
In the first decade of the 2000s, these four indicators reflected the U.S.’s low 
commitment to the defense of the Korean Peninsula. The major security threat of the U.S. 
was terrorism and the Middle Eastern countries that supported terrorist organizations. 
Thus, during this period, alliance cohesion was still weak. The main driver, leading the 
two countries to weaken alliance cohesion, was change in dominant U.S. threat 




VI. REBALANCING ASIA IN THE EARLY 2010S 
A. THE U.S. DOMINANT SECURITY OUTLOOK 
The U.S. has been the only global superpower for several decades since the Soviet 
Union collapsed. Yet, as its global rival and peer competitor, China has challenged the 
U.S. superior status. The rapid developments of China’s economy and the annually 
increased Chinese defense budget have led China to have advance military capabilities 
and embark on great power ambitions. To respond to the emergence of powerful China, 
the U.S. shifted its strategic priorities and changed its vital region from the Middle East 
to the East Asia. With Washington’s heightened attention to China, President Barak 
Obama declared “Pivot to Asia Policy.” The re-engagement to the Asia-pacific region 
became the diplomatic and strategic top priority to check the expansion of China. 
1. Major Driving Events 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has enjoyed unprecedented economic and 
military development; most experts have described China’s rapid development as the rise 
of China. The PRC is the third-largest country in the world in terms of territorial size and 
has abundant raw material and manpower. Based on these beneficial conditions, since the 
early 1980s, China has greatly improved its economic power. With its advanced 
economy, China has focused on modernizing its military forces that are commensurate 
with its economy. Since the 1990s, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has 
vigorously promoted the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). As a result, China has 
pursued regional hegemony.207 However, China’s excessive expansions of its influence 
and recent unilateral actions in the South and East China Sea have unnerved its Asian 
neighbors, and the United States has strongly voiced concerns over instability in the Asia-
Pacific region. 
Strong economic power is a driving force in the rise of China. The Chinese 
economy shows both unprecedented dynamism and unique complexity. Barry Naughton 
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argues, “Since the 1980s, China has consistently been the most rapidly growing economy 
on earth, sustaining an average annual growth rate of 10% from 1978 to 2005.”208 
Moreover, China has been known as the most populated country in the world: its 
population reached 1.35 billion people in 2010. Rapid economic growth, abundant raw 
materials, and sufficient manpower resources have indicated that China would eventually 
emerge into strong economies. In the 2000s, this expectation became a reality. As 
China’s gross domestic product (GDP) reached U.S. $2.225 trillion in 2005, it took over 
the fourth highest ranking. In 2010, its GDP level raised to the second position catching 
up with Japan. The GDP of China in 2013 is $9.240 trillion, which is the second highest 
following the U.S. $16.8 trillion. The annual GDP growth is around 9% between 1999 
and 2013.209 In addition, since 2004, China has become the world’s third-largest trading 
nation, following the U.S. and Germany. The economic emergence of China was the 
significant characteristic in the world economy in the last quarter of the twentieth century 
and China’s economic growth would be imperative in the twenty-first century.210 
Based on its strong economy, the PRC has focused on upgrading its military 
power. Since the 1990s, it has allocated its large budget on military modernization. 
China’s ultimate aim in its comprehensive military modernization program is to prevent 
Taiwan’s independence.211 In concert with this, the PLA has improved its military 
strength to win potential conflicts in the Taiwan Strait and to deter third-party 
intervention. However, the PRC’s objectives extend beyond strengthening control over 
the current sovereignty and territorial claims. The PLA is focusing on developing their 
military approaches to deal with various contingencies including Taiwan. As the PRC’s 
international influence and economic growth have improved, its goal of military 
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modernization has expanded from protecting its coast and domestic sovereignty to 
maximizing its national interest.212 
The main characteristics of PLA modernization unequivocally show the PRC’s 
objective: “China’s military investments provide it with a growing ability to project 
power at increasingly longer ranges.”213 China has been emphasizing the Air Force and 
Navy rather than the Ground force. The main missions of the Ground Force have been 
limited to border defense and domestic stability. The PLA Air Forces (PLAAF) has 
imported advanced aircrafts, such as Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, from Russia. The PLAAF 
also has developed its own avionic technologies: “the test of the next-generation fighter 
prototype highlights China’s ambition to produce [the advanced] fighter aircraft.”214 
In addition to the modernization of its air force, the PLA is also actively 
expanding space assets to achieve space superiority. The Annual Report to Congress in 
2014 argues, “With China emerging as the third space power after the United States and 
Russia, competition in outer space is becoming overheated between the countries in the 
region.”215 To increase its ability to use space, China has launched about 40 satellites to 
date, 22 of which have imaging capabilities sufficient to assist in detecting and tracking a 
carrier strike group.  
The PLA Navy forces (PLAN) have improved many combat ships with modern 
air defense and missile systems. Beijing has recently given highest priority to the 
modernization of the PLAN, leading to an extensive upgrade of its equipment that 
emphasizes Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities. It includes the upgrading of 
the nuclear-powered submarine and an aircraft carrier. 
With strong military might and economic capacity, Randy Schriver contends that 
China has changed its self-perception “from 150 years of shame and humiliation to a 
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great power mentality.”216 Schriver further argues, “China is growing not only in terms 
of its comprehensive national power, but also in its willingness and ability to promote its 
interests through the exploitation of that power.”217 China participates in major 
international issues and protects its national interests more actively than before. J. Ashley 
Roach contends that since 2009, China has addressed sovereignty issues such as 
territorial disputes more firmly: “four of the last five Foreign Ministry Statements have 
dealt with issues related to China’s claims either in the South China Sea or the 
Senkakus.”218 Beijing has pursued the consolidation of territories: Paracel Islands, 
Spratly Islands, Diaoyu (Senkaku) islands, the South China Sea islands, and Taiwan. 
With regard to Taiwan, Beijing has declared “the One China Policy.” Since reunification 
with Taiwan is the highest national objective of China, it has deterred Taiwan’s 
independence movements by political, economic, and social means. The PRC also firmly 
asserts military forces will be used to control Taiwan.  
Consequently, the PRC has pushed ahead with its military modernization program 
by constantly increasing its national defense budget. While the rise of China has been 
applauded by worldwide leaders, many of them, in private, worried about negative 
impacts that expansion of China’s economic, political, military influence would bring on 
the region.219  
2. U.S. Perception and Response 
The U.S recognizes the PRC as a potentially strong rival influencing the U.S.-led 
world order in the long run.220 China’s economic and military developments have led it 
to be one of two Superpowers; C. Fred Bergsten explains the meaning of “G-2” as “the 
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United States and China are the world’s two most important economies.”221 Within this 
context, President Barack Obama has emphasized the collaborative relationship with the 
PRC: “The United States and China are the world’s two most important economies, 
which is designed to preserve and enhance stability in the international system and the 
Asia-Pacific region.”222 
Although the U.S. has viewed China as a key partner for its security and 
prosperity, it also has also recognized China as a worrisome potential foe.223 According 
to the Annual Report to Congress 2014, the U.S. concludes that China will bring about 
instability: “China’s expanding interests have led to friction between some of its regional 
neighbors, including allies and partners of the U.S.”224 The PRC is focused on winning 
local, limited wars in its periphery to protect its territories, including Taiwan, in the short 
term, while pursuing efforts to protect its Sea Line of Communications (SLOCs) and 
economic interests worldwide in the long term. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review 
asserts that the “lack of transparency and the nature of China’s military development and 
decision-making process raise legitimate questions about its future conduct and intentions 
within Asia and beyond.”225 Although China has described itself as a benign and 
responsible developing country, its emphasis on defending territorial integrity, supported 
by a strong economy and developed military forces, has resulted in forceful rhetoric and 
confrontational behaviors in recent years.  
Additionally, China’s recent unilateral actions in the South and East China Sea 
have unnerved its Asian neighbors, and the United States has strongly condemned them 
as destabilizing. Furthermore, the PLA with rapid modernization has created fears of an 
arms race in the region. Schriver supported this view by arguing that “China’s military 
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modernization program is one of the greatest concerns to the U.S.”226 To respond to the 
major threat, the U.S. has paid attention to the PLA’s modernization. If China intends to 
expand its influence beyond Taiwan, the U.S. would intervene in the program to prevent 
instability in the East Asia region.227 
The U.S. has actively focused on Asia. In 2011, when President Barack Obama 
traveled to Honolulu, Australia, and Indonesia, he unequivocally stated his core message: 
“America is going to play a leadership role in Asia for decades to come.”228 In addition, 
Obama announced the major shift in its foreign policy. The U.S. changed its vital region 
from the Middle East to Asia.229 As a result, the Obama administration announced the 
East Asia foreign policy, known as “Pivot to Asia”; Asia became the top of America’s 
security priorities, and the U.S. increased its budget related to Asia issues. In Obama’s 
public speech to the Australian parliament in November 2011, he expressed his objective 
that “the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region [the 
Asia-Pacific] and its future.”230 The declaration of America’s strategic pivot to Asia 
clearly sought to generate confidence in America’s future leadership in this region and 
respect for Washington’s capacity to orchestrate this very impressive diplomatic tour de 
force.231 In accordance with the newly issued foreign policy, the U.S. Department of 
Defense issued the new Defense Strategic Guidance in January 2012. After evaluating the 
current complex strategic environments, it states the key strategy for each region in order 
to strengthen its global leadership. The main intention of the U.S is to maintain or 
increase the level of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region. The approach reflected the 
evaluation that the Asia-Pacific is the top priority region in its global strategy. 
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Although the Obama administration has constantly announced that one specific 
country is not its policy’s target, most experts see the main emphasis of the U.S. policy in 
Asia as responding to, and perhaps “containing,” China’s growing influence.232 
Washington increasingly needs to handle uncertainties in the region created by China’s 
growing military capabilities and its maritime territory disputes.233 Considering that the 
policy stems from concerns over China, the major aim is undoubtedly to check the 
expansion of China’s influence in the Asia-Pacific.234 During a four-country tour of Asia 
on April 2014, Obama cautiously mentioned China in his official speeches in all 
countries. He resolutely stated that China should not cause instability in the Asia-
Pacific.235 Regarding China’s territorial disputes such as Taiwan and the East or South 
China seas, the U.S. has contended that it has taken never position. However, considering 
that the U.S. has constantly emphasized peaceful and political resolutions, it has opposed 
China’s foreign policy. If China asserted itself and acted aggressively, it would trigger 
U.S.-China competition. 
As the U.S. perceives China as a potential threat, it reassesses the geographic 
value of South Korea. This need to reassess is similar to the geopolitical situation in the 
1980s during the second Cold War. Considering the geopolitical proximity between the 
PRC and the ROK, the ROK is a valuable location for military bases of the U.S. to 
monitor China’s behaviors. Specifically, South Korea is able to offer a critical naval 
tactical advantage for the U.S. Since the ROK is adjacent to the Yellow Sea and the 
South East China Sea, it becomes a significant naval strategic point to check the PRC. 
Since China has engaged in diverse maritime territorial disputes and suppresses Taiwan’s 
independence movements, the U.S. naval bases in South Korea are essential for the U.S.  
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B. THE COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE 
Watching the rise of China, Washington increasingly perceives China as a 
potential threat. The changes in dominant U.S. threat perception have led Washington to 
reevaluate the geographical value of the Korean Peninsula. The four indicators 
demonstrate that the shift in dominant U.S. threat perception has influenced the cohesion 
of the U.S.-ROK alliance in this most recent period. 
1. Official Statements and Documents by Leaders 
In the early 2010s, two countries’ presidents have specifically emphasized 
maintaining and strengthening the U.S.-ROK alliance. Whenever the countries’ summit 
meetings were held, both presidents always stated the importance of the U.S-ROK 
alliance. In addition, high ranking officials, including, the U.S. Secretaries of Defense 
and the ROK Ministers of Defense, have continually stressed the alliance and have 
discussed appropriate ways to facilitate mutual cooperation. Within the two countries’ 
official documents, many remarks on strengthening the alliance have been written.  
Both countries’ presidents have stressed the importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
When South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visited the U.S. in 2011, U.S. President 
Barack Obama stated that the U.S.-ROK alliance was unbreakable and stronger than it 
had ever been. ROK President Lee replied, “our alliance that was born of out of the 
trenches of war will continue to blossom. It will become stronger.”236 As for the ROK, 
President Park Geun-hye, who is a successor of President Lee, has also pursued a strong 
U.S.-ROK alliance. In 2013, President Park Geun-hye selected the U.S. as her first 
official visit nation among many allied nations. The first nation that a president visits 
during his or her term is symbolically a country’s most important ally. Therefore, 
President Park’s visit indicated Seoul’s commitment to reinforce the relationship with the 
U.S. Obama also interpreted her visit as a strong signal for a firm alliance, as he stated at 
the joint press conference, “I want to thank you for your strong personal commitment to 
our alliance. I was honored to welcome you to Washington for your first foreign trip as 
                                                 




President.”237 At the Summit meeting, the two presidents discussed diverse options to 
develop the U.S.-ROK alliance. Reflecting the two presidents’ common interests in the 
alliance, Obama stated, “we agreed to continue to modernize our alliance, including 
enhancing the interoperability of our missile defense systems.”238 Both presidents’ 
remarks, which have focused on strengthening the alliance, demonstrated strong alliance 
cohesion. 
Obama’s eight-day tour of Asia in April 2014 culminated in showing 
Washington’s will to strengthen the alliance; Obama visited Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines to restore credibility and reaffirm alliances. Many scholars 
and experts on East Asia paid attention to South Korea among these four nations. It 
became the nation that Obama most frequently visited–four time–during his term. 
Records of his visit to Seoul surpassed that of his predecessors: William J. Clinton and 
George W. Bush each visited three times.239 His visit aimed to intensify the alliance. At a 
joint press conference, President Park said, “[His visit] reflects President Obama’s special 
interest in Korea and full commitment and confidence to further strengthen the U.S-ROK 
alliance.”240 Responding to Park’s official remarks, Obama also stressed the significance 
of the alliance and reaffirmed U.S. support: “Our alliance remains a linchpin of security 
in Asia. America’s commitment to the South Korean people will never waver.”241 During 
Obama’s trip, the two presidents showed that their common objective was to improve 
defense capabilities. They jointly visited U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC). 
Considering it was the first time ever since the CFC was formed in 1978, the visit 
indicated the two presidents’ combined commitment to a strong cohesion of the U.S. – 
ROK alliance. Consequently, in the late 2000s, the summit meetings’ major topics and 
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results have reflected the alliance, which demonstrated a resolute will to solidify the 
alliance.  
Not only the presidents but also high ranking officials have specifically stated the 
significance of the alliance. Based on the agreement of both nations’ presidents, “2-plus-
2” Talks–the U.S. and ROK Foreign and Defense Minsters’ Meeting–were held in Seoul 
in 2010 and in Washington, DC, in 2012. In two meetings, ministers affirmed that the 
two nations commonly developed the alliance to respond to a rapidly changing security 
environment. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta officially stressed that the 
Asia-Pacific region was the key driver for the U.S. prosperity and security. Specifically, 
he described South Korea as one of important allied countries: “A linchpin of our Asia-
Pacific security is the U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea.”242 Consequently, 
leaders’ statements have commonly supported an even stronger alliance.  
Official documents issued by the two governments show this intention. Among 
many documents, the Joint Vision for the US-ROK Alliance has an important 
implication. To emphasize a close relationship, in June 2009, Washington and Seoul 
signed this document: “[It] provided the future-oriented blueprint for the development of 
the alliance.”243 Its aim was to develop a regional alliance to a more comprehensive 
alliance in order to respond to global threats and global security concerns. In accordance 
with this, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK minister of Defense signed the 
guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation at the 42nd SCM in 2010; the guidelines 
provided the future direction for the two nations’ military relationship.244 The guidelines’ 
main points were to strengthen the combined defense posture on South Korea and expand 
the military contribution to security in East Asia and Pacific region.245 
Several U.S. official documents have repeatedly emphasized the alliance. 
According to Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, the White House’s key defense strategy 
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is to strengthen its network of allies and partners.246 The U.S. will continue to promote a 
rules-based international order by building up constructive defense cooperation. When 
President Obama visited South Korea, the White house clearly announced that the U.S.-
ROK alliance was strong stating, “U.S.-ROK alliance is stronger and deeper than 
ever.”247 Washington described the alliance as “the linchpin of peace and security in the 
Asia-Pacific region and an increasingly comprehensive global partnership.”248 Thus, the 
major aim of the U.S. was not only to beef up the alliance, but also to broaden it from its 
main objective of protecting against various North Korean threats to a more 
comprehensive alliance. For regional and global security, peace, and prosperity, the goal 
of the U.S. will be to deepen a combined defense posture on the ROK and facilitate 
cooperation in the military. Therefore, official statements and documents in this period 
have clearly displayed that the two countries have focused on strengthening the alliance, 
which has resulted in greater alliance cohesion. 
2. Combined Exercises and Operations 
Combined exercises and operations have increased. Two large scale exercises 
have been conducted as previously arranged and the quality of exercise contents and the 
level of the exercise have been more developed. A great number of units including 
governmental institutions participated in the exercise. Moreover, seven combined 
exercises have newly been created.249 Invigoration of combined exercises demonstrated 
that during this period, the U.S-ROK alliance is steadfastly maintained and strengthened. 
The two U.S.-ROK combined exercises at a grand scale, Ulchi Freedom Guardian 
(UFG) and Key Resolve / Foal Eagle (KR/FE), are still being implemented: “Both the 
U.S. and the ROK continue to develop interoperability and readiness through the use of 
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annual combined exercises such as [UFG] and [KR/FE].”250 The aim of UFG is to 
upgrade theater operational command and execution procedure under a current or future 
combined system. By conducting wartime standard operating procedures (SOP), both the 
U.S. and the ROK military forces have been able to gain proficiency. UFG includes crisis 
management procedure exercises, wartime transition procedure exercises, senior leader 
seminars, and military coordination framework operating exercises. While the goal of 
UFG focuses on military command post and government exercises, KR/FE’s main point 
is to raise integration between command post and field units. Its purpose is to exercise 
theater operation command and execution procedure, to ensure deployment of U.S. 
augmentation forces on South Korea, and to maintain ROK armed forces’ warfighting 
sustainability. Considering that more units participate in UFG, and KR/FE to gain 
proficiency with integration in combined areas, these two exercises have contributed to 
strengthening alliance cohesion. 
Not only are existing exercises being implemented as planned but also several 
combined exercises have been newly established. According to the ROK Defense White 
Paper in 2012, the two countries agreed to start new seven exercises in 2009 and 2010.251 
In 2010, the Cobra Gold exercise and the Max Thunder exercise were started. The annual 
Cobra Gold exercise involved the two countries’ combined amphibious operations. It 
included tactical maneuvering exercises, maritime airlifts, and stabilization operations. 
The Max Thunder exercise focuses on the air force. Its purpose was to raise proficiency 
with realistic attack procedure by choosing virtual targets. It included strike package mid-
altitude infiltration training. In 2012, five exercises were newly added; a combined anti-
submarine exercise (ASWEX), a combined anti-submarine maritime search training 
(SHAREM), a peninsula operations readiness exercise (PENORE), the buddy wing, and 
combined unconventional warfare training (Balance Knife). The aim of ASWEX and 
SHAREM was to gain integration in the Navy forces’ operations. Finding and tracking 
the enemy’s submarines, launching torpedoes, and collecting anti-submarine data were 
involved. PENORE and the Buddy Wing are exercises of the Air Forces. Its main aim 
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was to improve combined operations and acquire new tactics. It included alert air 
interdiction operations, close air support operations, and counter fire training. The last 
exercise, Balance Knife, was related to Special Forces. Its key objective was to develop 
an unconventional warfare doctrine and facilitate cooperation in unconventional warfare 
operational execution capabilities. The newly added seven exercises show the shared 
commitment of the U.S. and ROK to intensify the alliance.252 
The two nations have made an effort to improve proficiency of combined 
operations by establishing a regular education course. Considering that the security 
environment in the Asia-Pacific region is getting more complex, the exact understanding 
of the environment is a key to maintaining peace and prosperity and protecting the Korea 
peninsula from various external threats. Within this context, in 2013, USFK command 
and the ROK ministry signed the memorandum of understanding (MOU) on the 
combined operation curriculum. The course is provided for the two countries’ field-grade 
officers, and its major aim is to enhance the efficiency of the united operation. 
Strategically and operationally, effective sharing of a combined operation plan provides a 
competitive advantage over the adversary. It consists of two courses; one is a working 
level education for majors and lieutenant colonel officers, and the other is advanced level 
education for full colonel officers. Instructors include USFK officers, professors at the 
ROK Armed Forces Staff College, and major commanding generals.  
Pushing its foreign policy of the pivot to Asia ahead, the U.S. needs to maintain 
and strengthen its allied countries. U.S allies also have a great interest in expanding their 
military relationship with the U.S. Kurt Campbell and Brian Andrews argue, “In 
broadening its defense engagement, the United States is responding to a demand signal 
from countries in the region seeking greater opportunities to train, exercise and interact 
with the U.S. military.”253 Within this context, the U.S. and its key allied partner, South 
Korea, have encouraged combined exercises, which have been a clear example of strong 
alliance cohesion. 
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3. The Institutionalization of the Alliance 
The U.S. and ROK have made great strides in the alliance institutionalization. The 
schedule of the transfer wartime Operational Control (OPCON) from the U.S. to the 
ROK has been delayed twice in 2010 and 2014. The two countries agreed to establish the 
Extended Deterrence Policy committee in 2010 (EDPC) to ensure the U.S. commitment 
to South Korea. The two nations also formed Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue 
(KIDD) in 2011 to increase the effectiveness of the security consultative system.  
At the U.S.-ROK Summit meeting on September 16, 2006, U.S. President George 
W. Bush and ROK President Roh Moo-hyun agreed to transfer wartime OPCON from the 
U.S. to the ROK. At the 38th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) on October 20, 2006, 
the U.S Secretary of Defense and the ROK Minister of Defense reviewed major issues 
closely related to the transfer of wartime OPCON. Both sides agreed to the timeline of 
the transition of OPCON to the ROK; expeditiously after October 15, 2009, but not later 
than March 15, 2012.254 Finally, both secretaries of defense, on February 23, 2007, 
confirmed that the transfer date was April 17, 2012. As the two countries’ presidents and 
secretaries of defense consented to the transfer of wartime OPCON, the highest military 
officers, the Senior United States Military Officer Assigned to Korea (SUSMOAK) and 
the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff signed the Strategic Transition Plan (STP) 
on June 28, 2007. The STP was a concrete guideline for implementing the wartime 
OPCON transition. 
The transition of wartime OPCON meant a weakening of the united defense 
posture. Since the defense system was led and controlled by the Commander of the CFC, 
the integration of operations is quite high. However, after completing the transition of 
wartime OPCON, the U.S.–ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) will be dismissed. 
The defense posture of the U.S.–ROK alliance will be transformed from the CFC-led 
system into defense system in which the ROK JCS will lead.255 Thus, the transition will 
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result in “a degradation of the commitment and confidence in the partnership on both 
sides,”256 and inevitably alliance cohesion will be weakened.  
 However, North Korea’s repeated provocations changed the road map of the 
transfer of the wartime OPCON. Pyeongyang committed several major military 
provocations against South Korea, and these provocations caused instability in East Asia 
beyond the Korean peninsula. Pyongyang executed a nuclear test and a long-range 
ballistic missile launch in 2009 and the attack on the ROK Ship Cheonan in 2010. In 
response to these provocations, public opinion was widely spread that the transition of 
wartime OPCON should be readjusted. Strategic evaluation by the military also 
supported deferring the date of wartime OPCON, because the ROK military did not have 
the capabilities to operate effectively as its own command by the original proposed year 
of 2012. The ROK government raised the issue of adjusting the timing of the wartime 
OPCON transition to the U.S. government and officially asked the U.S. to readjust the 
timeline. After close consultation between the two countries, at the June 2010 U.S.-ROK 
Summit, U.S. President Barack Obama and ROK President Lee Myung-bak agreed that 
the timing of wartime OPCON transition would be postponed from April 17, 2012 to 1 
December 2015.257 In accordance with the presidents’ agreement, the U.S. Defense 
Secretary and the ROK Defense Minister signed Strategic Alliance 2015 at the 42nd 
SCM, which would provide basic principles for wartime OPCON transition. At the 
second U.S.-ROK foreign and Defense Ministers’ meeting (2+2) held in Washington, 
DC, on June 14, 2012, the U.S. Secretaries and ROK Ministers reaffirmed that the date of 
transferring wartime OPCON to the ROK in 2015 was on schedule. 
In 2013, the Blue House requested to delay the transition of wartime OPCON 
again. After North Korea conducted a third nuclear test, the Korean government 
concluded that its military was not fully prepared. After having several meetings and 
consultations, Obama officially announced his decision to delay the transfer of wartime 
OPCON during his Asian tour in 2014. At the press conference in Seoul, President Park 
stated, “we shared the view that the timing and condition of the OPCON transfer slated 
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for 2015 can be reviewed.”258 Obama responded, “President Park recommended and I 
agreed that ... we can reconsider the 2015 timeline for transferring operational control for 
our alliance. Together we’ll ensure that our alliance remains fully prepared for our 
mission.”259 Given that the security environment in the region is getting more 
complicated and tensions in the Korean peninsula are escalating, Washington and Seoul 
reconsidered the schedule for the transition of wartime OPCON to the ROK. The leaders 
of both countries ordered their defense ministers to consult and determine appropriate 
timing and conditions. According to The Economist, the most significant outcome of 
Obama’s Asia trip was “military in nature,” which refers to the postponement of wartime 
OPCON.260  
At the 42nd SCM in 2010, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and ROK 
Minister of Defense Kim Tae-young signed an agreement to establish an Extended 
Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC). This committee contributed to reinforcing the 
U.S.-ROK alliance, because it reinforced the U.S.’s unswerving commitment to this 
alliance.261 According to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the Obama 
administration’s ultimate objective was to make the world safe and peaceful without 
nuclear missiles.262 To reach this goal, Washington adopted a new nuclear policy: 
“Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy.”263 Cheon 
posited, “reducing the role of nuclear weapons will also cause the effectiveness and 
dependability of extended nuclear deterrence to decline.”264 The changed U.S. nuclear 
strategy caused U.S. allies, especially South Koreans, to worry about security. Given that 
North Korea escalated inter-Korean tension through provocations such as attack against 
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the ROKS Cheonan, the U.S. security umbrella was important for Seoul to deter 
Pyeongyang. Reflecting the urgent security environment on the Korean Peninsula, the 
U.S. and South Korea established the EDPC to affirm the U.S. commitment to the U.S.-
ROK alliance. The 42th SCM joint communique stated, “Secretary Gates reaffirmed the 
continued U.S. commitment to provide and strengthen extended deterrence for the ROK, 
using the full range of military capabilities, to include the U.S. nuclear umbrella, 
conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities.”265 The U.S. clearly demonstrated 
its intentions that although the U.S.’s nuclear deterrence might not apply to all Korean 
peninsula contingencies anymore, its broader deterrence policy and capabilities would be 
never weak.  
Lastly, a newly established institution is the US-ROK Integrated Defense 
Dialogue (KIDD). At the 43rd SCM in 2011, the Minister and the Secretary created a 
new regular consultative mechanism: “The KIDD will be further developed and 
concurrently, the agendas and contents discussed by the two nations will be expanded to 
encompass Korea all areas of mutual interests, thereby further deepening and reinforcing 
bilateral cooperation.”266 As this dialogue is a policy consultation framework at the 
senior level, the Deputy Minister for Defense Policy, MND and the Undersecretary for 
Policy, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) co-preside. Its aim is to discuss 
and manage various the two nation’s security and alliance issues, including directions for 
future security cooperation and effective approaches for extended deterrence against 
North Korea’s WMD.  
In sum, in maintaining the combined defense posture and establishing new 
communications channels, institutionalized alliance cohesion has been strengthened.  
4. Combined Military Capability 
The two nations have focused on improving combined military capability. South 
Korea has spent a large portion of the defense budget on purchasing U.S. military 
equipment: “as part of its commitment to strengthen Alliance capabilities, the ROK is 
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continuing to procure major intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and 
weapons systems [including Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle systems].”267 In 
compliance with South Korea’s will to enhance combined military capability, the U.S. 
Congress agreed to upgrade ROK’s status as an arms purchaser. Thus, the ROK military 
is able to buy U.S. military equipment more easily and quickly. In addition, the U.S. 
executive branch, in 2012, revised the missile restriction of the ROK. The two nations 
were able to develop their interoperable ballistic missile defense systems, and South 
Korea has effectively upgraded its missile forces against the North’s Missile threats. 
South Korea has been a chief buyer of U.S. weapon systems: “The country is 
regularly among the top customers for Foreign Military Sales (FMS).”268 According to 
the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the ROK military purchased $966.9 million 
worth of U.S. arms in 2010 and $540 million worth of U.S. arms in 2011. However, the 
total cost of arms sales is higher when confirmed future major arms contracts are 
included. For the ROK’s third F-X in 2009 and 2010, ROK defense officials chose the 
Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter as its next main fighter aircraft in September 
2013. Although the total cost of the F-35 had exceeded the original budget, Korean 
defense officials concluded that among competing aircrafts, only the F-35 matched their 
Required Operational Characteristics (ROC) for stealth capability and interoperability. In 
March 2013, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) informed Congress of a 
possible FMS to South Korea for F-35 Joint Strike Fighters aircraft and associated 
services.269 The date of the first delivery will be 2018, and the estimated total cost, 
including aircraft and diverse supporting services, was $10.8 billion, the biggest arms 
purchase in Korean history.270 
South Korea has continued to modernize its military and strengthen its combined 
defense posture by importing U.S. arms. The DSCA announced that the ROK defense 
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minister decided to purchase AH-64 APACHE Attack Helicopters, AH-1Z COBRA 
Attack Helicopters, and MH-60R SEAHAWK Multi-Mission Helicopters.271 On 
September 2012, it notified Congress of two FMS contracts to the ROK; one was the 36 
AH-64D APACHE Longbow Block III Attack Helicopter and related services, and the 
other was the 36 AH-1Z COBRA Attack Helicopter and associated support. Each of 
estimated cost is $3.6 billion and $2.6 billion.272 In May 2012, the DSCA reported a 
possible FMS of MH-60R SEAHAWK Multi-Mission Helicopters to Congress. Its 
estimated cost was $1.0 billion.273 Additionally, the Korean government, in 2014, has a 
plan to buy U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); “the ROK military will buy four RQ-
4 “Global Hawk” UAVs at a price of $845 million in total.”274 Although European and 
Israeli defense corporations have competed for an arms sale to the ROK, South Korea has 
purchased the majority of its arms from the U.S. This exclusivity has contributed to 
enhance interoperability, which has resulted in strengthening the alliance. 
The U.S. executive branch as well as the U.S. legislature has emphasized 
solidifying the alliance. The U.S Congress “passed legislation that upgraded South 
Korea’s status as an arms purchaser from a Major Non-NATO Ally to the NATO Plus 
Three category (P.L. 110–429), which has become NATO Plus Five.”275 Regarding FMS 
to the government of Korea, Congress handed over its authority to the U.S. government; 
“the U.S. executive branch notify Congress of pending arms sales to South Korea, from 
$14 million to $25 million.”276 While congress has 30 days to veto arms sales for Non-
NATO allies, it has only 14 days for NATO Plus Three allies. Therefore, the elevation in 
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South Korea’s status meant that the ROK could purchase U.S. arms more easily and 
quickly.  
In October 2012, the U.S. agreement to revise South Korean Ballistic Missile 
Guidelines was important in the cohesion of the alliance. The U.S. DOD allowed South 
Korea to improve its missile forces. The ROK could extend “the maximum range of 
[Korea’s] ballistic from 300 km (186 miles) to 800 km (500 miles) and increase the 
payload limit from 500 kg (1,100 lbs.) to 1,000 kg (2,200 lbs.).”277 North Korea fired 
artillery shells and rockets at Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. To respond to conventional 
military attacks of North Korea effectively, the Lee administration officially demanded 
the negotiation of the restriction of ballistic Missile Guidelines. Having reviewed the 
Koreans’ proposal for two years, the U.S., in the end, agreed to the Korean government’s 
demands. Two governments described the revision as upgrading deterrence against the 
North’s provocations. The U.S. accepted Korea’s demands in spite of possible damage to 
its reputation related to restrict nations’ missile development. The priority of the U.S. was 
to strength the alliance, which resulted in strong alliance cohesion. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. has pursued a new military strategy in order to meet the demands of a 
changing strategic environment, characterized by the increase in China’s influence and 
Asia’s importance. China’s strong economic power and military strength has led the PRC 
to become a regional power for the short term and a worldwide superpower similar to the 
U.S. in the long term. In 2011, the Obama administration issued a foreign policy that 
concentrated on the Asia-Pacific region. To comply with this foreign policy, 
Washington’s first priority has been to intensify its security relationships with its allies. 
Its alliances have been the firm basis of engagement in the Asia-Pacific region and have 
played key roles in sustaining stability and security: “in partnership with its allies, the 
U.S. strives to create a stable security order that builds strategic confidence within the 
region and provides the context for states to build closer ties with each other.”278 South 
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Korea is a key partner of the U.S. to check the rise of China. Schriver argues that the U.S. 
can benefit from ROK’s support in coping with the rise of China; “South Korea’s role as 
a neighbor to China and a host of the U.S. military makes it a key factor in the dynamics 
of U.S.-Chinese security relations.”279 Within this context, the cohesion of U.S.-Korea 
alliance has been reinforced in the late 2000s. 
Both nations’ leading officials have officially described the U.S.-ROK alliance as 
a linchpin. Above all, the two countries’ presidents have continually stated the 
importance of the alliance in their official remarks. Military documents, such as Defense 
White Papers and the Strategic Guidelines, have clearly showed their resolve to 
strengthen the alliance. 
Regarding combined exercises and operations, seven exercises have newly been 
added. Reflecting the current security environments–unconventional attacks, and air and 
Naval provocations–these exercises have been established for Air Forces, Navy Forces, 
and Special Forces. Two existing comprehensive exercises, Ulchi Freedom Guardian 
(UFG) and Key Resolve/Foal Eagle (KR/FE), have been developed in its quality of 
contents and its sizes.  
Alliance institutionalization is the most distinguished of the four indicators. The 
date of the transfer of wartime OPCON has been delayed twice. Completing the transfer 
of wartime OPCON according to the existing timeline would greatly weaken the 
combined defense posture. The U.S. intended to reduce its political and economic burden. 
However, the instability caused by the rise of China has forced the U.S. to focus on the 
Asia-Pacific region again. Therefore, the U.S. agreed to readjust the date to respond to 
this instability. As the CFC system will have been maintained for a while, alliance 
cohesion will have been intensified. By establishing the EDPC, the U.S. reaffirmed its 
unswerving commitments to South Korea. South Korean greatly reduced its worry about 
the U.S.’s security umbrella. In addition, the two nations have also made an extra 
consultative mechanism, which has contributed to strengthening alliance cohesion. 
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 The U.S and ROK have modernized combined military capacities. The ROK has 
been a major purchaser of U.S. arms. The ROK military decided on the F-35 as its next 
generation air fighter, instead of other nations’ aircraft; the F-X project’s cost was almost 
$ 11 billion. As the U.S. also elevated the purchasing status of the ROK, the ROK 
military was able to buy the U.S. arms more conveniently. FMS has contributed to goals 
of the U.S. foreign policy by meeting defense demands of allied countries. Therefore, this 
upgrading of ROK’s status has meant that the ROK has become a more important partner 
of the U.S. in Asia-Pacific region: “it is vital to the U.S. national interest to assist our 
Korean ally in developing and maintaining a strong and ready self-defense capability.”280 
The U.S. also acceded to ROK’s demands on revision of ballistic missile guidelines 
although it received serious criticism from other countries. These common efforts to 
improve their combined capabilities have showed strong alliance cohesion. 
In 2009 and 2010, these four indicators reflected the U.S. and ROK’s shared 
commitment to the defense of the Korean Peninsula. These two nations have transformed 
the U.S.-ROK alliance from protecting South Korea to serving as the linchpin of regional 
peace and stability. Thus, during this period, alliance cohesion has been reinforced. The 
main driver, which has encouraged the two countries to strengthen the alliance cohesion, 
is change in dominant U.S. threat perception, the rise of China. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Since the U.S.-ROK alliance was formed in 1953, it has been regarded as quite a 
strong alliance with a long lifespan of more than half a century. Although the two 
countries have maintained the alliance for over sixty years, they sometimes have faced 
significant conflicts of interest, which weakened the alliance. This thesis has investigated 
the key factors shaping the cohesion of the U.S.-ROK alliance. In order to find the 
significant determinants, the thesis research examines how cohesion in the alliance has 
evolved since the end of the Korean War. Previous research has focused on South Korean 
variables: South Korea’s economic development and the rise of its nationalism. To 
balance the South Korean side, this thesis examines the U.S. variables. The U.S. has 
decided its attitudes toward this alliance, following its national interests. 
This research chronologically evaluates alliance cohesion from 1970 to 2013 and 
excludes the early period of the alliance, from 1953 to the 1960s. Following the five 
major driving events of the U.S., the author divides the whole period into five sub-
periods: Détente in the 1970s, the second Cold War in the 1980s, the collapse of the 
USSR in the 1990s, global terrorism in the first decade of the 2000s, and the rise of China 
in the early 2010s. The change in alliance cohesion is measured not in absolute terms but 
in relative terms. Comparing to the strength of alliance cohesion over several periods, this 
thesis expresses the level of alliance cohesion as strong or weak.  
To gauge alliance cohesion objectively, this research selects four indicators. The 
first indicator, official statements and documents by leaders, is derived from agreements 
and interests. Reflecting on interests of their own states, high-ranking officials of allied 
negotiate over extended periods to reach an agreement. Thus, official statements and 
documents by leaders reflect these bargains. The second indicator is combined exercises 
and operations that stem from military cooperation. Allies conduct diverse regular 
combined exercises to improve the effectiveness of military operations. The third 
indicator, the institutionalization of the alliance, is related to both military cooperation 
and sharing costs and rewards. Once the institutionalization of the alliance is established, 
the responsibilities of respective allies for military actions are elaborated. Allies agree 
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with the level of military burden sharing through alliance institutions. The last indicator is 
combined military capability, which is closely related to sharing costs and rewards. Allies 
improve the effectiveness of military actions to upgrade their military armaments in 
accordance with allied partners’ equipment.  
The results of the analysis suggest that dominant U.S. threat perception drives the 
strength of the alliance. When dominant U.S. threat perception changed, the cohesion of 
the U.S.-ROK alliance changed well. If the U.S. perceived security threats in the Asia-
Pacific region, alliance cohesion became strong. On the other hand, in the case of that the 
U.S. perceived security threats outside of this region, or emphasized its economic 
interests more than its security interests, alliance cohesion became weak.  
Table 4 shows the U.S. perception of crises from the 1970s to the early 2010s. In 
the 1970s, détente reduced the U.S.’s threat perception of the USSR, because Soviet 
threats were greatly diminished. However, the U.S. still perceived the USSR as a threat, 
because their competition was not fully ended but suspended. In the 1980s, the USSR 
invaded Afghanistan, which caused the second Cold War. The U.S. again perceived the 
USSR as a major threat. In 1990–2001, since the Soviet Union collapsed, the U.S. did not 
have any major threat. However, when the September 11 attacks took place, the U.S. 
started to perceive global terrorism and some Middle Eastern countries as primary 
threats. In the first decade of the 2000s, China succeeded in developing its economy and 
military. The PRC became a global power alongside the U.S in the early 2010s. The U.S. 
began to perceive China as its potential major threat. 
Table 4.   Dominant U.S. threat perception 



























Table 5 shows the strength of alliance cohesion in each period. If U.S. threats 
were related to South Korea in terms of geography, alliance cohesion became strong. On 
the other hand, if South Korea had no regional proximity with the U.S. threats, the 
cohesion of the alliance became weak. Alliance cohesion, in the 1970s and 1980s, 
depended on the U.S.’s relationship with the USSR. During the Cold War, South Korea 
played a key role in checking the U.S.’s main enemy, the USSR. Given South Korea’s 
geographic proximity to the USSR, South Korea was an ideal advance base for U.S. 
armed forces to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union. In addition, the two Koreas’ 
conflicts were proxy wars for the two superpowers. Although the origin of the Cold War 
was in Europe, severe Cold War conflicts took place in the Korean Peninsula, including 
the Korean War. For the U.S., South Korea’s victory was essential to the U.S. position in 
Cold War competitions. Therefore, in the era of détente, alliance cohesion became 
relatively weaker, and it became stronger again in the second Cold War. In the 1990s and 
the first decade of the 2000s, South Korea’s location was not relevant to global terrorism. 
Although the ROK supported the Afghanistan War and Iraq War, it detached few non-
combat troops. As a result, alliance cohesion became weaker than in the 1980s.  
Table 5.   The cohesion of the U.S.-ROK alliance 
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However, alliance cohesion became stronger in the early 2010s. With its 
advanced military and economy, China has pursued a regional hegemony and challenged 
the U.S.-led international order. With regard to the rise of China, the U.S. has perceived it 
as a strong potential rival and threat. Considering that South Korea and China are closely 
located, a close U.S.-ROK alliance would provide military benefits for the U.S. in the 
case of conflict between the U.S. and China. 
In conclusion, since the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in October 
1953, the U.S.-ROK alliance was sometimes strong, other times weak. Previous research 
has focused on Korean variables to find the significant determinant shaping alliance 
cohesion. However, the results of this research suggest that when South Korea is 
correlated to dominant U.S. threat perception, alliance cohesion is strong. Consequently, 
from the 1970s to the early 2010s, changes in dominant U.S. threat perception have been 
the most important driver of alliance cohesion. 
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